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EXPLOITATION OF
RELIGION AND TERRORIST
ORGANIZATION
DAESH

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General Directorate of Religious Publications
Department of Publications in Foreign Languages and Dialects
Tel: +90 (312) 295 72 81 • Fax: +90 (312) 284 72 88
e-mail : yabancidiller@diyanet.gov.tr

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INTRODUCTION

In the face of alarming developments, spearheaded by terrorist organization DAESH, which grew dire enough to threaten the safety of the Islamic world, the Presidency of Religious Affairs issued a call for common sense on 18.06.2014 with the awareness of its responsibilities towards the Ummah of Islam and the family of humanity. Translated into eight different languages, the call made a tremendous impact worldwide, garnering massive support from all over the Islamic world. Subsequently, the Presidency gathered “World Islamic Scholars Initiative for Peace and Common Sense” on 17-19.07.2014 due to the insistent demands from Muslim institutions, organizations, and representative offices in various countries. The meeting elaborately covered developments that had been threatening peace and common sense in the Islamic world; the final declaration issued after the meeting shared with the global public the common opinion of scholars representing the world of Islam.

In order to provide a healthy perspective for the public about DAESH, our Presidency published the work titled “The Fundamental Philosophy and Religious References of Daesh” (Ankara, 2015) afterwards. Said report supplied healthy information about the organization known through various media including social media; it constructed a framework that would be the basis for any future studies to be conducted on the organization’s basic philosophy and style of approach. However, the multitude of questions directed at the Presidency about DAESH from inside and outside the country, and the fact that it became imperative beyond mere necessity to give further

information to especially the youth about this organization and its acts made it obligatory to compile a more extensive report. To that end, at the High Board of Religious Affairs meeting dated 18.11.2015 with participation of the President of Religious Affairs, it was decided that the necessary efforts would be initiated to make up a new report that would analyze issues further and show the organization's own publications and documents as reference. The efforts of the Presidency of Religious Affairs in this field become all the more meaningful given the fact that the necessary emphasis on this topic has unfortunately not been placed in the world of Islam so far.

While the Presidency's previous report on the ideology and mindset of the organization largely fulfilled the need in terms of informing the public, new developments have made it necessary to compile a more comprehensive report. This report intends to expand upon the previously established framework, go deeper into the subsections of outlined topics, put forward the organization's approach in a detailed way, and then assess the views in light of an accurate Islamic perspective. As this work is aimed at examining the Islamic understanding of the organization called DAESH and their approach toward religious texts, the information regarding its formation process and structure was taken as a reference as long as it contributed to the said purpose. In short, the report you are reading primarily deals with the religious approach of the organization and reflection of that approach on their doctrine and understanding of fiqh. Effective combat with DAESH and similar groups essentially depends on eliminating all political, social, and economic inequalities. In addition, it is self-evident that mainstreaming an accurate and reasonable understanding of religion in our country and in the world of Islam as well as elevating the level of scholarly efforts would play a crucial role in fighting these groups which have a propensity to trap the youth using a number of religious

arguments. One of the goals of this report is to make a contribution to the related awareness-raising process.

There are economic, political, sociological, and cultural reasons for the recent increase in the number of organizations similar to DAESH and for the fact that young Muslims easily fall into the trap of these groups which have a tendency for violence. In that context, the following observations can be made about Muslims living in Western countries: Millions of Muslims who had immigrated from Muslim countries to Western Europe and North America since the Colonial Age to earn a living were initially welcomed with tolerance; however, when it became clear they were there for good and they resisted assimilation, an increasingly prejudiced attitude began to take shape against them. It led to a resurgence of xenophobia and the birth and spread of Islamophobia in those countries when the next generation of Muslim minorities learned the language of the country they lived in and demanded their democratic rights. It was seen in this process that the violent organizations in Islamic countries particularly carried out their propaganda operations on the Muslim youth, who felt marginalized merely for being a Muslim or foreigner in countries they had been born and raised, and Western countries, in spite of this, fell short of working towards resolving the issues. As a result, these ideas that call people to violence spread among Muslim youth. Instead of developing a series of measures and employing policies that would facilitate integration and encourage Muslims to adapt to the Western communities they lived in, European countries discriminated among Muslims as the moderate and the radical with an arrogant and imperious attitude, which they then spread through mass media and eventually it drove Muslims into a constant siege mentality within the Western society. It was inevitable that this was going to cause identity crisis and a psychological sense of inferiority among Muslim youth.

These points must be emphasized regarding the impact of recent global events on the Muslim world: The invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, the September 11 Attacks, the imposed deadlock on the Palestine issue, and the utter silence or very few weak reactions from the world against the anti-democratic suppression of democratic requests in Arab Spring have caused the spread of desperation and despair in Muslim countries.

Casting Sunni Arabs widely out of the government with sectarian policies after the invasion of Iraq gave radical groups the opportunity they needed. And the groundwork was laid in every respect for emergence of the inhumane organization known today as DAESH.

This should be kept in mind while evaluating the report: organizations such as DAESH are a concept produced in modern times by political, economic, and social injustice, international power struggles, and ensuing conditions. It is not right to consider them a consequence and product of some sort of a perception or an interpretation of Islam. In addition, DAESH and similar organizations express themselves through a religious discourse, and make the utmost use of hadith and verses to back their arguments. However, religious discourse is a result and appearance rather than reason; in other words, even when we assume that they do not have religious references, it is inevitable that the current international conditions and factors will bring out similar movements. They are using Islam's language only because the outcome of said causes and conditions have manifested themselves in the Muslim region. If the same situation had occurred in India or China, Indians and the Chinese would have probably adopted a language in relation with Hindu and Confucian narratives.

In summary, it would be a rather naive expectation to think that misinterpreting hadith and verses has made way for this organization and that we can only get rid of them by rectifying our religious

understanding. For this reason, it is necessary to develop a healthier attitude and get out of this state, which constantly keeps the Muslim world in a defensive position and causes it to waste its energy in wrong places and therefore leaves Muslim communities in a reactionary stance. We should keep in mind that only by eliminating the injustice could we be able to clear away DAESH and similar organizations which are products of the modern era, the unjust conditions, and the specific international factors.

In the context of the organization's formation; the process that goes from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who fought the Russians in Afghanistan and later carried on his activities in Jordan and Iraq, to the taking over of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has been covered in numerous works by experts in political science, international relations, terror, and strategy, and it has been examined from various aspects. The global and local causes that laid the groundwork for its development-some of which we have pointed out- have also been discussed at length in the related literature. In this regard, the human resource that forms and feeds the organization and their characteristics are important in terms of a healthy analysis of DAESH's religious ideology. It is significant that the young members that constitute the organization's backbone had to live in war territories for years under the shadow of violence and savagery, unable to receive any education. The second young group that joins the organization consists of children of immigrants, called "colonial immigrants", who were ostracized and scorned in Europe. Having born of Muslim parents, these kids have taken refuge in Islam as an ideology due to suffering a grave identity crisis. The third group is the recently-converted young Muslims. Their misfortune is to learn Islam from other Muslims who are going through an identity crisis. Therefore, they have also leaned towards violence. The common denominator of all three groups is that they have adopted the mentality of practices, violence, and hatred they picked from hadith and verses

that reflect the battle conditions and conjecture of the early Islamic era, instead of the high values and teachings of Islam formulated as faith, deed, and morals which can be considered Islam's main message.

It has been highlighted that the radicalization tendency is influential in choosing to join the group for newly-converted Western members called "homegrown" who take up a considerable portion of DAESH's human resource, and for next-generation Muslims who grew up in Western countries. It is said that organizations like DAESH offer a so-called holistic ideal to the youth to mend and rebuild themselves, who are in a deep conflict with the value system, order, and ideals of the society they live in and who have combined their exclusion with hatred. In that context, "Islamization of radicalism" is brought up. However, it is well-known that there are very different motives that lead people to the process called radicalism. It should not escape the attention that a radicalization process which uses Islamic motifs is possible just like how Islamophobia, which can be considered the reemergence of the Crusader mentality today, has surfaced despite the love-themed narratives in modern Christian literature, and how Buddhist monks tortured Muslims in Arakan despite the peaceful elements in the Buddhist teaching. However, it should be expressly stated that it does not in any way stem from Islam's own dynamics. With that being the truth, in order to set forth that DAESH and similar groups have exploited Islamic values, the next section of this report will include scholarly analysis demonstrating that the organization does not rely on a consistent method to obtain religious knowledge. In that sense, the narratives produced by the organization in fields of faith and deed and their acts in practice will be analyzed in light of traditional and modern scientific approaches.

I. DAESH'S UNDERSTANDING OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE

A. DAESH'S UNLAWFULNESS OR ABUSE OF RELIGIOUS TEXTS

While teaching the principles of Islam, Prophet Muhammad (saw) also taught the methods of understanding and implementing the hadith and verses. Accordingly, Muslims came up with “usul al-din” (principles of religion) to figure out and interpret the fundamentals of faith based on the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah of the Prophet (saw). In addition, they developed a discipline named “usul al-fiqh” (principles of Islamic jurisprudence) to explain the formation process of religious rulings and set the rules for an accurate understanding of religion. The Prophet (saw) had taught the Sahabah generation (Companions of Prophet Muhammad) how to understand and implement the Holy Qur'an, who then passed on the religious rulings they had learned from the Prophet (saw) to their pupils from the Tabi'un generation (meaning "Successors", the next generation after the Companions). The ways of reaching a solution in newly-encountered issues were determined by considering the practices of the Companion generation; as the accumulation of knowledge passed on from generation to generation, schools of Islamic philosophy and jurisprudence developed a very consistent, sophisticated, and sound understanding of religion. There were also attempts while the Companion were still alive to build verdicts by interpreting verses solely based on the text and the

wording, remaining outside the aforementioned process without any grasp of the “knowledge” passed on by the Prophet (saw) or studying as the pupils of the jurist Companions.

An approach that decontextualizes verses of the Qur'an and disregards the main goals (maqasid al-Shariah) of hadith and verses was first brought up by a group known as the Kharijites. One of the most striking interpretations was voiced by Nafi ibn al-Azraq, a Khawarij leader. He made a tragic deduction from the verse... *“My Lord! Leave not one of the disbelievers on the earth! If You leave them, they will mislead Your slaves, and they will beget none but wicked disbelievers.”* (Nuh, 71/26-27) which is a cry to Allah the Exalted from the Prophet Noah who was frustrated with the disinterested attitude and pressure of his tribe. He made the interpretation based on this verse that even the preadolescent children of Khawarij opponents, who were declared unbelievers, could be killed.¹ This example shows how a verse was decontextualized, misinterpreted, and turned into an argument that justifies the slaughter of innocent people. The attitude of Khawarij, which can be considered the prototype of groups like DAESH in terms of exclusionist religious discourse, is maintained by their modern successors. Ibn Abbas, who was sent by Ali to negotiate with the Khawarij, had to remind them that they were distant from the Prophet's (saw) friends and that's why they could not benefit from their knowledge, and therefore they were devoid of a healthy religious understanding.² Similar criticism is directed at DAESH today, saying that they are trying to make deductions from hadith, verses, and age-old works despite their lack of necessary scholarly capacity. Moreover, it has no basis in the scholar tradition of Islam. It is also evident that there is and will be no legitimate basis for DAESH's decontextualizing

1 Mubarrad, *al-Kamil fil-luga wal-adab*, pub. Abd al-Hamid Hindawi, y.y. undated, III, 105.

2 Al-Nasa'i, Sunan Al-Kubra, Beirut 2001, “Khasais”, 51, no. 8522; Ibn al-Humam, *Fath al-Qadir*, Bulak 1316, IV, 410.

of verses and making interpretations without taking into consideration other related evidence and the primary goals of religion.

DAESH's approach is eclectic and arbitrary while referring to hadith, verses, and works in our tradition. Besides, it is seen that they place special emphasis on authors such as Ibn Taymiyyah and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. The compilation titled Majmu' al-Fatawa that contains the works of Ibn Taymiyyah, ibn Abd al-Wahhab's Kitab al-Tawhid and the commentaries written by his followers on the book, and the collected works titled as Al-Durar Al-Sanniyyah containing the works of ibn Abd al-Wahhab and his followers are among the frequently used references in the organization's publications. For this reason, emphasis must be placed on the salafi perspective as DAESH attempts to look like a part of it to legitimize itself.

B. THE SOURCE DAESH USES AS A STEP FOR THEIR DISTORTION: THE LITERALIST-SALAFI STYLE

In Islamic thought, the word "Salaf" is used to refer to the early generations, especially the Companions and the Successors. The attitude confined to the framework offered by the hadith and verses without any interpretation especially in matters of faith was also generally referred to as "salafi attitude" and the hadith experts and jurists who adopted this style were called "salafis".³

Today, DAESH and similar groups have set off on a quest to attain legitimacy by relating themselves to al-Salaf al-Salihun (the righteous predecessors). They pick literalist tendencies, mostly among the salaf, that will serve them as a basis. Among the related sources of reference, the group called Ahl al-Hadith and Ashab al-Hadith stands out. Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah are individuals they use as

³ See İzmirlı İsmail Hakki, *Yeni İlm-i Kelâm*, İstanbul 1339-1341, 1, 98.

reference. Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab comes to the forefront as a source of reference in the modern age. In the 18th century when Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab lived, it was said while inquiring into the reasons for negative conditions in the Islamic world during the reforms that people had steered away from the pure understanding of Islam, imitation and fanaticism had become a disease, the comments based on hadith and verses had been replaced by the personal thoughts and ideas of the ulama (scholars), and many superstitious beliefs had infiltrated into Islam through Sufism. This attitude gradually intensified in the following centuries. These reformist tendencies that arose in the early modern and modern eras called for a return to the pure understanding of Islam in the early period, i.e. the salaf era, and made it their motto. The term “Salafiyah” came to the forefront in the 20th century to roughly describe this style.⁴

The conjuncture in the Islamic world in 20th century paved the way for the salafi style to also become a political idea. The Salafist political movements in Egypt and Pakistan were effective especially during the Cold War. Jihadist movement after the invasion of Afghanistan had the same trend. Radical groups that emerged or grew more active in the post-September 11 period also have a salafi trait to their religious perception. DAESH legitimizes itself with that kind of a salafi style; and their main source of influence is the Wahhabi movement which took shape in the 18th century around the ideas of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and later turned into an ideology in the modern era. The references DAESH uses in their texts show that they are close to the Wahhabi style. However, it is not possible to position all of the current salafi movements at the same point and say they are all prone to violence. There are different classifications to indicate the difference such as “Reformist Salafis”, “Revolutionist

⁴ Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, “Günümüzde Selefilik ve İslamî Hareketlere Olan Etkisi”, *Tarihte ve Günümüzde Selefiler*, İstanbul 2014, p. 485.

Salafis”, “Wahhabi Salafis” or “Saudi Salafis” and “Jihadist Salafis”.⁵ There are deep splits in opinion in certain salafi groups particularly in terms of political stance and use of violence. In fact, it is a clear indication of this point that there are serious accusations and criticism in DAESH publications towards the government of Saudi Arabia. The split between Saudi Salafis and Jihadist Salafis demonstrates the difference of political attitude between two movements that feed on the Salafi-Wahhabi style. In that context, using the term "revolutionist movements" for groups that are prone to violence seems more accurate as it does not include any abuse of a Qur'anic concept such as "jihad".

DAESH's relation to the exploited salafi style manifests itself as the standing out of the literalist character in their statements. However, it is far away from being a systematic and coherent approach. Indeed, their approaches are entirely arbitrary and eclectic; and thus it is understood that the religious approach of DAESH lacks any methodology.

C. CHARACTERISTIC OF DAESH'S IDEAS: ECLECTIC PRAGMATISM AND LITERALISM

Ideologies are described as “a distorted image of truth”. They include truth at their core. However, the product is a distorted reflection of it. Primary references used by DAESH and similar groups are in primary sources accepted by all Muslims such as the Qur'an, Sunnah, Tafsir, Hadith, and Fiqh literature. However, the process of distortion manifests itself in the style those are utilized. For example, the verse which describes Allah Almighty's domination over the universe saying, “*Surely, His is the creation and commandment...*” (A'raf, 7/54) was shown by the organization in their articles as the

⁵ Hilmi Demir, *Selefler ve Selefi Hareket İsid Ne Kadar Sünnidir?*, 21. Yüzyıl Türkiye Enstitüsü (Özel Rapor), August 2014, p. 14; Büyükkara, “Günümüzde Selefilik ve İslami Hareketlere Olan Etkisi”, p. 488 et al.

basis for the verdict to stay away from the “elections of polytheism” in Turkey.⁶ By eclectically reading the Qur'an for a practical purpose, they suggest their militants that they read it without any prior knowledge. Abu Bara al-Hindi, a member of the group, said this in a footage published in July 2014: “Open the Book and read the verses on jihad. It will be all clear. All the scholars tell me (This is lawful, that is unlawful, that is not the time for jihad)...Leave all that aside and read the Qur'an. You will find out what jihad is!”⁷ This is a striking example demonstrating the lack of principles in their strategy. From that aspect, it is clear that someone trying to understand the hadith and verses within a certain principle and capacity someone cannot be easily manipulated into becoming a live weapon. In a December 2001 interview, Bin Laden himself glorified the lack of principle and the shallowness saying, “The young people who carry out operations are not followers of a fiqh in the general sense of the word. The only fiqh they acknowledge is what has been brought by the Prophet (saw).” Similar statements are found in a treatise of Juhayman al-Otaybi, the leader of al-Haram occupation in 1979. Al-Otaybi wrote that the members of his group did not seek advice from the ulama they did not trust, they only consulted hadith collections and respected interpretation of Salafiyah to learn about religious matters, and in this way Allah provided them with more information.⁸ Confirming one another, these statements also give insight into how radical salafi groups approach sources of religious knowledge. Considering that DAESH and similar groups appoint individuals without deep knowledge of fiqh in fatwa positions, it becomes much clearer why their fiqh practices are so shallow and inadequate.

As is seen, organizations such as DAESH have no ulama and therefore possess an entirely modern character. Scholars who do not

⁶ *Konstantiniyye*, 1437/4, p. 62.

⁷ *Risâle Meftûha ile'd-doktor İbrahim Avvâd el-Bedrî el-Mulakkab bi "Ebû Bekr el-Bağdâdî"*, p. 4-5 (<http://www.lettertobaghdadi.com/14/arabic-v14.pdf>).

⁸ Büyükkara, “Günümüzde Seleflilik ve İslami Hareketlere Olan Etkisi”, p. 504-505.

support such movements are people whose views are not respected by them. Any scholar who makes the smallest critique of their actions can be accused of all sorts of things including being a Zionist.⁹ And they declare why the views of scholars who do not join them are unreliable with the slogan “the qa’id (those who do not participate in jihad) cannot issue fatwas to the mujahedeen”.¹⁰ Consequently, an introverted ideological organization that does not make healthy use of accurate sources is a convenient place for tendency to violence.

⁹ Hisham al-Hashimi, عالم داعش, London 2015, p. 46.

¹⁰ Abdullah b. Abdullah al-Hashimi, *Tahzîru’l-tâiș min dalâli Dâiș*, Dâru Mâcid el-Asîrî 2015, III, 129.

II. THEIR VIEW ON RELIGIOUS CONCEPTS

A. WHO IS A MUSLIM?

To answer this question with one sentence, according to the organization's opinion, a Muslim is someone who obeys DAESH or lives in regions controlled by them. DAESH interprets for their own benefit the ideas on faith by the Salafi-Wahhabi style, which they have adopted, and the reflection of this can be seen in their dismissive and alienating attitude toward other Muslims. The Salafi-Wahhabi concept of faith was summarized in a contemporary work as follows: "Faith is about affirmation by heart, acknowledgment by word, and performance of deeds. Absence of one will impact faith. The belief regarding Allah and His attributes should be as stated in the Qur'an and hadith. Interpreting the allegorical (mutashabih) verses and informative attributes in light of principles and fundamentals obtained from decisive (muhkam) verses as in the science of Kalam is not permissible. Tawhid has facets of rububiyah, uluhiyyah, and deeds. All these facets must be there in whole when acknowledging the oneness of Allah. A person with a lack of intellect and deed in this regard would be committing shirk (associating partners with Allah); therefore, it would mean rejecting religion and they would be declared an unbeliever. A person who commits major sins would also be a disbeliever but it would not render a person non-Muslim.¹¹ Shirk and

¹¹ On this issue also see Heyet, *ed-Dürerü's-seniyye fi'l-ecvibeti'n-Necdiyye*, [y.y.] 1996, I, 480-484.

kufr are not to be tolerated for any reason whatsoever. Putting off the verdict of shirk and kufr just because it has emanated from Muslims or being flexible in certain reasonable ideas on the issue would mean irja (postponement). It is a practice of the deviant Murji'ah sect and should be avoided. *Al-Wala*, i.e. befriending believers, and *wal-Bara*, i.e. keeping away from unbelievers and opposing them, is one of the most important essentials of faith.”¹²

On the other hand, according to the definition of faith which is adopted by schools of Maturidi and Ash'ari that represents the majority of Ahl al-Sunnah, the real important matter in faith is affirmation. Acknowledgement is a must for a person to be considered Muslim in the world.¹³ Deeds are not included in the nature of faith. However, even the Ahl al-Hadith group of Ahl al-Sunnah, which included deeds in faith, did not –mainly consider the lack of deeds a reason to be completely rendered non-Muslim by defining certain sub-distinctions. But they accepted that faith would increase or decrease in those cases.¹⁴ These approaches offer an inclusive perspective that enable those who commit big sins to be considered Muslim. However, DAESH's viewpoint on faith, which bears resemblance to the faith and kufr understanding of Mu'tazilites and Kharijites, nurtures alienating and dismissive attitudes that may lead to practices of takfir. Indeed, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the leader of the group before Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, decided the destruction of the structures regarded as a reflection of shirk to be the first of nineteen principles that define the organization's doctrine. The organization adopts it as an essential of faith that the Shiites are a polytheist, apostate, and disbelieving community; establishing a political party and participating in the

12 Büyükkara, “Günümüzde Selefilik ve İslami Hareketlere Olan Etkisi”, p. 486.

13 Abu al-Mu'in al-Nasafi, *al-Tamhid li-qawaid al-Tawhid*, Cairo 1986, p. 377-378; Nur al-Din al-Sabuni, *el-Kifâye fi'l-Hidâye*, Beirut 2014, p. 353; Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, *al-Ma'alim fi usul al-din*, Cairo undated., p. 127. Some scholars from the same schools included acknowledgment by word in the nature of confirmation. See Kemal b. Ebî Şerif, *Kitâbü'l-Müsâmere*, Istanbul 1979, p. 286-287.

14 For further information on the approach of Ahl al-Hadith regarding faith, see Sönmez Kutlu, *İslam Düşüncesinde İlk Gelenekçiler*, Ankara 2000, p. 73-152.

election is an act of blasphemy; and clashing with the police and soldiers of taghut (satanic) regimes is a religious obligation.¹⁵ These facts are a testament to what DAESH understands from the concept of faith.

B. WHAT IS APOSTASY AND WHO IS CALLED AN APOSTATE?

Apostasy is the abandonment of Islam by a Muslim by openly rejecting it or converting to another religion. An apostate refers to someone who has abandoned Islam by rejecting it and joined the enemy (therefore can be fought against). However, DAESH describes apostate as “the term referring to someone who, despite sound faith, commits any acts or utters any words deemed forbidden by Shari’ah, hence becoming rendered a non-Muslim.”¹⁶ By doing that, they state that the actions and words which count as disobedience should also be considered apostasy. However, if there is no sincere rejection behind words and actions, it is not right to regard a person as disbeliever. Because kufr is divided into two categories: Actual kufr and judicial kufr. Actual kufr is when a person renounces their religion of their own volition and proclaims it without any pressure or force. If there is intimidation (iqrah) or pressure, the declaration and confession is deemed void. Judicial kufr is when somebody is accused by others of “becoming a disbeliever” due to their words or actions. Such labeling must be carefully avoided. Because having faith is up to a person’s own will. Only their statements must be considered valid in this case. As a matter of fact, the Prophet (saw) did not declare even the hypocrites as disbelievers. For they declared being believers and since there is no possibility of seeing into their hearts, they cannot be deemed disbelievers. However, they are indeed disbelievers by Allah

¹⁵ *ed-Devle el-İslamiyye tettehiz mine’t-tekfir akide ve’l-irhab menhec* (<http://www.alarab.co.uk/m/?id=30354>).

¹⁶ *Konstantiniyye*, 1436/1, p. 22.

Who knows their hearts. And it will be known by all with the Day of Judgment. However, since nobody can know a person's heart but Allah, any verdict on the issue must be taken with great caution. In fact, when Usama ibn Zayd killed someone who had said he converted to Islam during battle, thinking "he became a Muslim out of fear", the Prophet (saw) condemned and warned him saying, "*Did you open and look into his heart?*"¹⁷

What DAESH does is an invalid practice of "judiciary takfir" entirely based on bias. DAESH uses the term "hypocrite" particularly for members of other groups they fight against in Syria. Taking it even further, they even addressed the wives of warriors in other dissident groups and said "their husbands were hypocrites, therefore they would commit adultery if they were to continue their marriage, and for that reason they should leave their spouses and immigrate to areas controlled by DAESH."¹⁸ Many people are publicly executed for apostasy, which is done as a way of intimidation, and the executions are announced in their media organs.

There is no sanction in the Qur'an other than tribulation after death for an apostate.¹⁹ When the Prophet's (saw) statement on material sanction²⁰ is evaluated together with the 72nd verse of Surah Al-i 'Imran, it is seen that this is a precaution for a plot against Muslims. In fact, it has been determined in literature that the Prophet (saw) did not personally take anyone's life for converting their faith.²¹ Having evaluated the evidence with insight, Islamic jurists stressed that the enforcement imposed on apostates is not because of religious conversion, its sanction will be implemented in the afterlife. Imposing worldly sanctions on the apostate stemmed from the perception of the time that conversion was thought as changing a social preference and

17 Muslim, "Faith", 158.

18 Salih Huseyn er-Rakb, *ed-Devletü'l-İslamiyye (DEAS)*, Gaza 2015, p. 164.

19 Baqarah, 2/217; Al-i 'Imran, 3/69-91; Ma'idah, 5/54; Nahl, 16/106.

20 Bukhari, "Jihad", 149; Abu Dawud, "Hudud", 1.

21 Al-Ayni, *Umdat al Qari*, Beirut undated, XXIV, 80.

siding against one's own society. (Islamic jurists) such as Abu Hanifa who approached the topic from this angle said men would get death penalty; they did not deem any penalty necessary for the women because of the capability of damaging the Muslim community.²² Because death penalty for apostasy is implemented when the person becomes a belligerent, in other words, has the potential of joining the enemy side. These explanations show us that the perception of Islamic jurists also took shape according to the conditions of the period. The traditional practice in Islamic literature against apostates finds its meaning within an era's sense of war and peace, international relations, and legal structure. Indeed, numerous modern fuqaha have expressly stated that the sanction prescribed for apostasy in fiqh literature is periodic. However, despite a lack of scientific capacity to evaluate the hadith, verses, and fiqh rulings within a social and historical context and using the periodic verdicts of the literature as a tool for intimidation, DAESH continues its executions for apostasy.

C. A TOOL FOR MARGINALIZING AND DEFAMING MUSLIMS: IRJA

The dictionary defines irja as postponement or delay. As a religious term, it means grounding religion on faith, putting off deeds, and postponing the ultimate verdict on the lack of deeds. DAESH describes the concept of "irja" and the Murjite style that is claimed to adopt this concept as the most dangerous bid'ah (baseless innovation in religious matters) threatening the faith of Islam.²³ The magazine Dabiq includes the following statements on the issue: "*Salafi scholars have made serious warnings against the bid'ah of postponement. Because it was a deviant bid'ah that watered down the religion of*

22 Serahsi, *el-Mabsüt*, Istanbul 1983, X, 110; Merginani, *el-Hidaye*, Daru'l-Farfur, Dimashq 2006, II, 462-463; Ibn al-Humam, *Fath al-Qadir*, IV, 389; Kaşif Hamdi Okur, "İslam Hukukunda İrtidat Fiili İçin Öngörülen Asli Yaptırım Üzerine Bazı Düşünceler", *Gazi Üniversitesi Çorum İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 2002/1, p. 355-356 (<http://ktp.isam.org.tr?url=makaleilh/findrecords.php>).

23 Bekir Topaloğlu – İlyas Çelebi, *Kelam Terimleri Sözlüğü*, Istanbul 2010, p. 158, 236.

Muslims and made major sins and even kufr seem trivial. Through irja, Muslim masses began to abandon their prayers and pursue worldly—and even worse—perverted affairs instead of religious ones. They even turned away from learning religion".²⁴ The reason why irja causes all these negative outcomes is that it excludes deed from the definition of faith and defends that the essence of faith is affirmation by heart and acknowledgment by word. And the emergent mentality was that abandoning religious obligations and committing major sins would not affect one's faith.²⁵ As understood from this approach, when DAESH refers to irja, they in fact target the faith understanding of Maturidi and Ash'ari which represent the majority of Ahl al-Sunnah. However, different meanings have also been attributed to irja in these circles. Because irja has been used throughout history as "a tool for defaming the opponent". As a result, each school produced different perceptions on irja and Murji'ah.²⁶ As a matter of fact, the famed Islamic Geographer Al-Muqaddasi said the following on Murji'ah: "The Murji'ah are those who do not consider deed a part of faith according to Ahl al-Hadith, who ignore the obligatory deeds according to Karramiyyah, who remain noncommittal on the issue of faith according to Ma'muniyyah, and who do not deliver any opinion on mortal sinners according to Mu'tazilite Kalam experts, that is, they assume a position between two positions and thus lack projection".²⁷ According to Shiites, "the Murji'ah are those who abstain from finding those against Ali in the wrong, who consider the entire ahl al-qiblah believers due to their apparent affirmation and who expect mercy for this".²⁸ These opinions are important in that they show how much the

²⁴ *Dabiq*, 1436/8, p. 39.

²⁵ *Dabiq*, 1436/8, p. 42.

²⁶ See Çağfer Karadaş, "Mürce'nin Mezhepliği Problemi ve Ebû Mansûr el-Mâtürîdî", *Milel ve Nihal Dergisi*, 2010, v.VII, i.2, p. 191-221 (<http://ktp.isam.org.tr/?url=makaleilh/findrecords.php>).

²⁷ Al-Muqaddasi, *Ahsan al-taqasim*, (pub. M.J. De Goeje), E.J. Brill 1906, p. 38.

²⁸ Sa'd b. Abdullah el-Kummi, *Kitâbü'l-makâlât*, Tehran 1963, p. 5-6, 12.

meaning and scope ascribed to the concept of Murji'ah differs from school to school.

DAESH describes those they deem Murji'ah as “who do not regard deed as a part of faith and think that lack of deeds will not affect faith as long as one has faith” which runs counter to the description of Murji'ah adopted by Ahl al-Hadith. However, the group they define as Murji'ah never underestimate deed; but they think it is better to handle two matters separately based on the phrases “believers” and “committers of good deed” in the Qur'an. If deed had any value alone, the deeds of hypocrites would be accepted. Also, faith without deed was not very much favored by Islam's ulama. However, all Sunni schools including Ahl al-Hadith that contains Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Ibn Taymiyyah, and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah believe that a person with lack of good deeds is within the bounds of Islam. Ahl al-Hadith opines that faith increases or decreases depending on deed. It was interpreted by other schools as the increase or decrease of faith's strength/quality rather than the increase or decrease of issues of faith.

The reason why DAESH attacks the Maturidi-Ash'ari faith perception over irja, a concept that excludes deed from the scope of faith, is that it hinders the practice of takfir, DAESH's most important instrument of marginalization.

D. INSTRUMENT OF MARGINALIZING MUSLIMS: TAKFIR

Takfir means claiming a Muslim, or someone known to be a Muslim, has committed kufr and he is a disbeliever. It is a fact that the concept was perceived as a weapon in various periods of history and various groups and factions attempted to defame and marginalize their opponents through takfir. Similarly, it is seen that DAESH practices the act of takfir on any group and their members

which they consider to be political enemies, especially groups that are against them. Reasons for takfir include negotiating with Americans, participating the elections, or working as a public servant in Iraqi or Syrian administration. DAESH also declares those released after spending some time in Western prisons as unbelievers, claiming they would not be released if they did not sell out their religion.²⁹ Yet, it is intriguing that their leader al-Baghdadi was also imprisoned for a while and released afterwards. All these show that the organization uses the concept of takfir as a tool that serves their strategy, entirely disregarding religious responsibility.

The main approach in Islam regarding takfir is that someone who says they are a Muslim and defines themselves as a Muslim cannot be accused of being a “disbeliever”. A believer is anyone who heartily embraces and verbally states the testimony. “There is no deity but Allah, and Muhammad is His servant and messenger”. In this regard, the Holy Qur'an States: *“O you who believe, when you go forth to fight in the cause of Allah, investigate; and do not say to one who greets you ‘You are not a believer!’ aspiring for the goods of worldly life; for with Allah are many acquisitions. You were like that before; then Allah conferred His favor upon you. So investigate thoroughly. Indeed, Allah is ever, with what you do, Acquainted.”* (Nisa, 4/94). The Prophet (saw) also said that those who utter the kalimah al-tawhid, who pray facing the qiblah, and who eat the meat of animals sacrificed by Muslims are considered Muslims; they are under the protection of Allah and His Messenger.³⁰ In light of the aforementioned hadith and alike, verses, and practices, it became one of the basic principles of Ahl al-Sunnah that a person from the ahl al-qiblah cannot be declared an unbeliever for committing a sin provided that they have not deemed something forbidden as permissible.³¹ Running the takfir mechanism

29 Şalih Hüseyn er-Rakb, *ed-Devle*, p. 94-105; Ebu Abdullah Muhammed el-Mansûr, *ed-Devletü'l-İslamiyye beyne'l-hakika ve'l-vehm*, y.y., undated p. 78-102.

30 Bukhari, “Iman”, 17, “Salat”, 28; Abu Dawud, “Jihad”, 95.

31 el-Hakim es-Semerkindi, *es-Sevâdü'l-a'zam*, Istanbul 2013, p. 17-18; Babertî, *Şerhu'l-Akideti't-*

for political and worldly goals like DAESH does is going beyond the line of Ahl al-Sunnah.

The most common takfir method of DAESH is to exploit hadith and verses by using them for their own political intentions. As a matter of fact, by disregarding the context of verses “*And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed – then it is those who are the disbelievers.*” (Ma’idah, 5/44) and “*He shares not His legislation with anyone.*” (Kahf, 18/26) they called the Muslims in Turkey, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey, and political party leaders in Turkey to repent by alleging that democracy and forming a legislative parliament is becoming a non-Muslim.³²

However, based on the main principles of Ahl al-Sunnah, these verses were interpreted as “those who do not acknowledge the revealed rulings of Allah”.³³ It looks quite plain and simple when the issue is put forward as “Allah’s Law” on one side and “Law of Humans” on the other. But it proves to be just the opposite from the perspective of “literalist interpretation advocates who claim to be implementing Allah’s law” on one side and “those who support a finalist interpretation that shows regard to the primary goals of religion and the objective of hadith and verses” on the other. If not applying the hadith and verses in their literal sense is disobeying the command of Allah, many mujtahids could be accused of the same thing including Umar (RA) who did not literally implement verses on issues of zakat for bringing hearts together (Tawbah 9/60), amputating a thief’s hand (Ma’idah, 5/38), and distribution of war booty (Anfal, 8/1,41). The problem here is to act upon what is on the surface rather than properly assessing and interpreting the hadith and verses which was first done in history by Kharijites and Ali (RA) was the first victim.

Tahâviyye, Beirut 2009, p. 94-97; İbn Ebi'l-İzz, *Şerhu'l-akideti't-Tahâviyye*, Cairo undated, p. 250.

³² *Konstantiniyye*, 1437/4, p. 63.

³³ Molla Hayâlî, *Haşiye alâ Şerhi'l-Akâid*, İstanbul 1308, p. 78; Âlûsî, *Rûhu'l-meânî*, Beirut 2009, III, 314; Heyet, *Sorularla İslam*, DİB Yayınları, Ankara 2015, p. 28, 163.

Even Ibn Taymiyyah, who is one of the authors frequently referred to and considered an authority by DAESH, separated "a certain action being the reason for takfir" and "declaring the particular individual who commits that act as unbeliever". If there is no clear statement from the person as to why they have done it, ruling that they have become non-Muslim based on the act is not right.

As narrated from his pupil Al-Dhahabi, Ibn Taymiyyah said toward his death: "I do not declare anyone from the Ummah as unbeliever. The Prophet(saw) said: 'Only a believer proceeds with ablution and prayer.'³⁴ Whoever performs ablution and goes on with the prayer, he is a Muslim."³⁵ This is an indication that Ibn Taymiyyah did not declare any Muslim from ahl al-qiblah as unbeliever.

The reason why Islamic scholars are cautious on the matter of takfir is the Prophet's (saw) harsh warning to anyone who calls a Muslim "disbeliever".³⁶ Because the main criteria here is the premise that "a servant only leaves religion when they reject affirmation which is what makes them a believer".³⁷ Acts and attitudes that push this premise also push the level of Ahl al-Sunnah.

E. AN EXCUSE TO MARGINALIZE MUSLIMS AND DESTROY HISTORIC HERITAGE: SHIRK

As in other salafi groups, DAESH categorizes visiting tombs and praying through certain people deemed to be distinguished as shirk, and considers the verses on idolaters to be referring to those people as well.³⁸

³⁴ Ahmad b. Hanbal, *Musnad*, V, 282.

³⁵ Zehebi, *Siyeru âlâmi'n-nübelâ*, Beirut 1983, XV, 88.

³⁶ Ahmed b. Hanbal, *Musnad*, II, 18; Bukhari, "Iman", 17, "Adab", 73; İbn Hacer el-Heytemî, *Tuhfetü'l-muhtâc*, Egypt 1938, IX, 88.

³⁷ Babertî, *Şerhu'l-Akâidetü't-Tahâviyye*, p. 97.

³⁸ *Konstantiniyye*, 1436/2, p.4-8.

The distance between similarities and identity must be taken into consideration when handling religious issues. There is great difference between being an idolater and acting similarly or using similar words. It is the same case with hypocrites and disbelievers. Doing similar things with a hypocrite or disbeliever and being one are entirely separate matters.

Visiting a grave is already a legitimate act approved by the Prophet (saw) and carried out since then. Doing it for personal benefits or for expectation from the dead lying in the grave is not right in terms of religion. However, if the visitor prays by the grave but submits their request directly to Allah, it is extremely wrong to include it in the scope of shirk. Because there is no clear hadith or verse specifying that one cannot pray by a grave. In fact, al-Dhahabi, a pupil of Ibn Taymiyyah who is among the main references of DAESH, narrates from Ibrahim al-Harbi from the school of Ahl al-Hadith that people would pray by the grave of Maruf al-Karkhi thinking their prayers would be more worthy of being answered. He himself states that prayers said in blessed places are more favored like the prayers said in masjids following morning prayer, and adds: "Supplication of a person in trouble is more acceptable no matter where he does it".³⁹

When the issue is broached away from any extremism, it becomes clear that the real cause for shirk is to turn graves into places of worship. However, the grave visits are lawful when carried out in the form of greeting and praying in accordance with the practice of the Prophet (saw). Any person in their right mind would know the difference between two. Every Muslim believes that Allah Almighty is one in being, in attributes, and in actions. The belief that any of His qualities is also found in one of His creatures will lead a person to shirk. However, the grave visits carried out to remember the afterlife

³⁹ Zehebi, *Siyeru âlâmi'n-nübelâ*, IX, p. 343-344.

and take lessons, following the Prophet's (saw) advice⁴⁰ are not of such nature.⁴¹

A reflection of the relation DAESH made between graves and shirk manifests itself in destroying historical heritage and showing animosity towards culture. The most apparent example of this attitude is the destruction of historical artifacts and especially the graves related to prophets. To defend this attitude, the organization published a brochure saying only the location of Prophet Muhammad's (saw) grave is known, there is dispute over the location of Abraham's grave, the locations of other prophets' graves are not known, therefore the claim that the graves they are demolishing belong to prophets is unrealistic. As the justification for their grave-demolishing, they bring up the story⁴² about the Prophet (saw) ordering Ali (RA) to fix graves that are elevated above ground level.⁴³

Nevertheless, it is essential to build a grave in a modest way. There is no harm in surrounding a grave with suitable material to protect it from damage and getting lost and place a stone at the top on which the name of the deceased is written. In that context, it is narrated that the Prophet (saw) forbade building anything on graves.⁴⁴ On the other hand, the bodies of the Prophet (saw), Abu Bakr (RA) and Umar (RA) are located in a cell. It goes to show that certain Companions thought the hadith forbidding the construction of buildings and domes on graves did not have any absolute verdict and it was limited to certain conditions and situations. It can be seen in a number of practices in that way. It is not a violation of the ban in hadith. Rather, as in the act of grave visiting, a ban to protect the tawhid belief had been initially introduced, but it was softened to a certain extent in accordance with

40 Muslim, "Janaiz", 106, 108; Abu Dawud, "Janaiz", 81.

41 Ahmed b. Zeyni Dahlân, *ed-Dürerü's-seniyye fi'r-red ale'l-Vehhâbiyye*, Egypt 1319, p. 5.

42 Muslim, "Janaiz", 31.

43 *el-Kavlü'l-fasl fi meşrûiyeti hedmi'l-kubûri'l-mez'ûme li enbiyâillâh (aleyhimü's-selâm)*, 1435, p. 4. (<https://alhimma.wordpress.com/2016/01/18>)

44 Muslim, "Janaiz", 32.

social demand and with the decrease in the danger of deviating from tawhid and going back to shirk.⁴⁵ Judging the hadith on the issue out of their historical and social context, DAESH perceives them as an order to destroy graves. However, building tombs over the graves of famous scholars and pious people, which DAESH considers to be within scope of shirk, is considered lawful by many scholars.⁴⁶

In parallel to their attitude on graves, DAESH also destroys statues and historical artifacts like temples, defining the act as “knocking down the idols”.⁴⁷ It prevents Muslims from practicing a Qur'anic command such as taking lessons from the humanity’s journey in history. In fact, the Qur'an says: *“So have they deniers not traveled through the earth and have hearts by which to reason and ears by which to hear? For indeed, it is not eyes that are blinded, but blinded are the hearts which are within the breasts.”* (Hajj, 22/46) Destroying historical heritage and wiping away the signs that show the attitudes assumed by humankind in various periods, DAESH is in a state of complete lack of foresight. However the Companions, who personally witnessed the era of shirk, did not demolish buildings considered as Prophets’ graves when they conquered Damascus and Bayt al-Maqdis. Umar did not touch them despite seeing them with his own eyes. It is also narrated that prominent Salaf al-Saliheen (one of the righteous predecessors) such as Ibn Umar (RA) and Sa’id Ibn Al-Musayyib (RA) prayed by the minbar (pulpit) of the Prophet (saw).⁴⁸ As the Righteous Predecessors had such an approach towards religious historical memories, certain people who identify themselves as “Salafis” destroyed many artifacts that had the memories of the Prophet (saw), Companions and Righteous Predecessors in ancient cities of Islam, where the Islamic civilization was born and prospered.

⁴⁵ Mehmet Şener, “Kabir (Fıkıh)”, *DİA*, XXIV, 35-36.

⁴⁶ Ali el-Kârî, *Mirkâtü'l-mefâtiḥ*, Beirut 2001, IV, 156; İbn Abidin, *Reddül-muhtâr*, Riyadh 2003, III, 144; Remli, *Nihâyetül-muhtâc*, Beirut 2003, III, 34.

⁴⁷ *Konstantiniyye*, 1436/1, p. 25-27; 1436/3, p. 68-69; *Dabiq*, 1436/8, p. 22-24.

⁴⁸ İbrahim er-Râvî er-Rifâî, *Risâletü'l-evrâkı'l-Bağdâdiyye fî'l-havâdisi'n-Necdiyye*, Istanbul 2002, p. 143, 148.

It is an irreparable loss for Islam's cultural heritage. It shows how destructive the literalist-salafi mentality is in relation to historical and cultural awareness. The same mentality is found in other radical groups that feed on the same vein. Thus, labeling those who lawfully pay grave visits and do not attack historical artifacts as "quburis" and "idolaters"⁴⁹, DAESH follows the narrow-minded representatives of the Salafi vein on this issue as well.

F. DAESH'S SEARCH FOR LEGITIMACY: FITAN NARRATIONS

It is a fact that throughout history, groups clashing with each other wanted to benefit from the Prophet's (saw) authority to solidify their own position. Many narrations inherited into hadith literature were interpreted and used in this way. This was especially effective in evaluating the news called "fitan narrations". Narrations about the incidents claimed to happen as the Doomsday approached are named "fitan" and "malahim" narrations in Islamic culture. The same literature is called "apocalyptic literature" in Ahl al-Kitab circle while there is a striking similarity between two genres. Considering the knowledge the Prophet (saw)⁵⁰ had on ghaib (the invisible) and the general framework of Qur'an and the Sunnah, it can be said that news about the future that are not included in the Qur'an but attributed to the Prophet (saw) is a problematic area.⁵¹ In fact, traces of many incidents from history can be found in fitan literature. For instance, there is a narrations in Abu Dawud's Sunan that foresees a person named al-Harith will emerge from the region of Mawara-al-Nahr, he will support the Prophet's (saw) Ahl al-Bayt, and every Muslim is supposed to help him.⁵² The person in question is al-Harith ibn

49 Ebu Abdullah Muhammed el-Mansür, *ed-Devletü'l-İslamiyye beyne'l-hakika ve'l-vehm*, p. 102.

50 Mehmet Paçacı, "Hadiste Apokaliptisizm veya Fiten Edebiyatı", *İslamiyat*, 1998/1, p. 35-53.

51 Mehmed Said Hatiboğlu, *Hız. Peygamber ve Kur'an Dışı Vahiy*, Ankara 2009, p. 163.

52 Abu Dawud, "Mahdi", 12 (no. 4290).

Surayj who rebelled against the Umayyad and was killed in 128 AH (746 CE).⁵³ Experts who criticized and found the narration weak in terms of isnad (chain of transmitters) did not link the narration's content with this historical figure.⁵⁴

DAESH also predicates their discourse of undertaking a divine mission on a massive war to take place between Muslims and Christians near the Day of Judgment. As a matter of fact, there is an anticipation in Ahl al-Kitab (People of the Book) culture for big wars under "Armageddon Wars" to occur when the doomsday approaches.⁵⁵ According to the story that DAESH uses as basis, the Day will not come until a big war breaks out between Muslims and Christians in A'maq or Dabiq. The Muslim army that will face Christians will set off from Medina and consist of the best people on the earth. Muslims will emerge victorious in this fierce battle, and then they will conquer Istanbul. As the warriors distribute war booty while resting their swords on olive trees, a rumor will be spread that Dajjal has appeared and remaining families are not safe. When Muslims go back to Damascus and prepare for war, the Prophet Jesus will come and kill Dajjal⁵⁶. DAESH legitimizes itself based on this narration, inviting volunteers to fight on their side claiming that the time for battle of Dabiq has come. The hadith in question clearly states that the Muslim army will hail from Medina. However, even though it is known that nobody has joined DAESH from Medina, this detail is concealed during propaganda. In fact, inspired by this story, the group named its magazines "Dabiq" and "Konstantiniyye".

In their propaganda for Turkey, DAESH presents it as a divine news that they will be the ones conquering Istanbul. Also based on the

53 İbn Kesîr, *el-Bidâye ve'n-nihâye*, Beirut 2004, II, 1477; Van Vloten, *Emevi Devrinde Arap Hâkimiyeti Şia ve Mesih Akideleri Üzerine Araştırmalar*, tran. Mehmed S. Hatiboğlu, Ankara 1986, p. 40-41, 76-77.

54 Azîmâbâdî, *Avnü'l-mabûd*, Beytü'l-efkâr ed-Devliyye, Ammân undated, p. 1839-1840. Also see İbn Khaldun, *el-Muqaddimah*, Beirut undated, p. 313-314.

55 Mustafa Bıyık, *Armagedon ve Tanrı Krallığı*, Ankara 2008, p. 251-259.

56 Muslim, "Fitan", 9 (no. 2897).

narrations in fitan literature,⁵⁷ they claim that Istanbul will capitulate to their army with takbirs and without any clash.⁵⁸

However, the reality is that Istanbul was conquered in 1453 by Mehmed the Conqueror. It is a known fact that the hadith attributed to the Prophet (saw) which serves as encouragement and objective saying, “*Verily, Constantinople shall be conquered. What an excellent commander is its commander and what an excellent army is its army!*”⁵⁹ depicts⁶⁰ this conquest.⁶¹ So, the opinions about expecting a new conquest near the doomsday is extremely meaningless and indecent. Until modern times, there has never been any hesitation from the past ulama about the conquest of Istanbul by Mehmed the Conqueror. Despite that, DAESH uses a manipulative narrative towards their target audience saying Istanbul will be conquered again.

In that context, while DAESH seeks support from narrations for its own legitimacy, it is seen that their opponents also refer to narrations to alienate and pacify DAESH. While stories about Kharijites in hadith literature are linked to DAESH on one side, on the other, something that is narrated as a statement from Ali (RA) but is seriously questionable⁶² based on hadith criteria is identified with DAESH.⁶³ The narration is as follows: “Stay where you are when you see the black banners.

57 Muslim, “Fitan”, 18 (no. 2920); Ibn Majah, “Fitan”, 35 (no. 4094).

58 *Konstantiniyye*, 1436/1, p. 4-6.

59 Ahmed b. Hanbal, *Musnad*, IV, 335; Abdurrahman el-Bennâ, *Bulûgu'l-emânî min esrârî'l-fethî'r-rabânî*, Amman undated, IV, 4565, 4668; Bukhari, *et-Târihu'l-Kebîr*, Haydarâbâd 1360-1363 I/2 (second chapter), 81; a.mlf., *et-Târihu's-Sagîr*, Cairo 1977, I, 306; Taberânî, *el-Mu'cemu'l-kebir*, Bağdat 1978, II, 24; Heysemî, *Mecmeu'z-Zevâid*, Beirut 1987, VI, 219; Hâkim, *Müstedrek*, Beirut undated, IV, 422. According to Zahabi, the hadith is authentic. For two studies asserting the authenticity of this hadith, see Ali Yardım, «Fetih Hadisi Üzerine Bir Araştırma», *DİB Dergisi*, Ankara undated, XIII/2, p. 116-123; İsmail Lütfi Çakan, *Hadislerle Gerçekler*, İstanbul 2003, p. 459-462.

61 Mehmed Arif, *Bin Bir Hadis*, Cairo 1325, p. 291. Translating and expounding the Dabiq story used by DAESH, Ahmed Davudoğlu agreed with the general opinion saying, “Istanbul was conquered and the miracle of the Messenger of Allah sallallahu alayhi wa sallam took place indeed.” See Ahmed Davudoğlu, *Sahih-i Müslim Tercüme ve Şerhi*, İstanbul 2013, VI, 5098.

62 Ebu Abdullah Muhammed el-Mansûr, *ed-Devletü'l-İslamiyye beyne'l-hakika ve'l-vehm*, p. 107-110. This book shows that the narration is not authentic by providing information about narrators of the story based on dignitary sources.

63 *Risâle Meftûha*, p. 26-27.

Do not move your hands and feet. An unregarded, weak group will emerge after them. Their hearts like pieces of iron. They run the state. They do not honor their words and the deals they make. They call to truth but they are not among the people of truth. They use tags as name. They are attributed to residential areas. Their hair is long like a woman's and swaying. They exist until a dispute breaks out among them. Then Allah bestows the truth upon anybody He wants."⁶⁴ Every single sentence of this narration is linked to DAESH and the message is that people must keep away from DAESH at all times and never support them. However, as stated above, there is no need to use such narrations to criticize a movement whose damage on Islam, Muslims, and the whole world is quite obvious.

G. KHARIJISM AND DAESH

It is understood from basic texts of the organization that they often emphasize their allegiance to the faith of Ahl al-Sunnah and that they even consider themselves as the true representatives of Ahl al-Sunnah. On the other hand, other groups that are against DAESH link them entirely with the Kharijites. Extraordinarily irritated by that, group members vehemently reject the characterization, claiming there are concrete differences between them and the Kharijites.⁶⁵ When the principle put forward by Ibn Abidin, one of the great scholars of the recent era, which says: "For a group to be considered Kharijite, it is enough when they believe that the people they fight against and treat with a hostile attitude are disbelievers."⁶⁶ is used to determine the position of DAESH according to Ahl al-Sunnah, the main branch of Islam, it is clearly seen that DAESH is outside mainstream Ahl al-

⁶⁴ Ali el-Muttakî el-Hindî, *Kenzü'l-ummâl fi's-süneni'l-akvâl ve'l-efâl*, Beirut 1985, XI, 283 (no. 31530).

⁶⁵ <https://ansarkhilafah.wordpress.com/2015/10/03/islam-devleti-harici-mi/>

⁶⁶ Ibn Âbidin, *Reddü'l-muhtâr*, VI, 413.

Sunnah as their dismissive attitude toward other Muslims is evident in their actions and documents.

Even though it is possible to call DAESH “Neo-Kharijites” based on their similar traits with the Kharijites, and that some of their attitudes agree with Salafist thought; in fact, our region and the world are facing a brand new fact never seen before in the history of Islam’s religion and civilization. Essentially a violent-based product of the modern era, DAESH is an organization without any line and comparison which was born and raised within the conditions that caused its emergence although there are superficial similarities with certain groups from our tradition in some ways.

III. DISTORTING FIQH CONCEPTS

It is seen that the group's documents frequently attribute fiqh literature. However, it is clear that self-interest is the determining factor here. They can use any reference that may support their views without seeking systematic consistency. Adopting a mentality of the Salafi-Wahhabi style, the group did not see any harm in referring to authors such as al-Juwayni and Al-Ghazali from the Ash'ari school, which they described as "the bid'ah of irja", while asserting their understanding of faith to ground the issue of caliphate. Unable to find any exact sources to legitimize their suicide attacks, DAESH went as far as to say "nobody should dwell on the surface of shari'ah rules."⁶⁷ Opposing groups frequently state the lack of well-equipped personnel for issues of fiqh, it is even said that "uneducated bedouins" are in a position to issue fatwas for the group. This section will cover the primary claims and actions of the group in terms of fiqh.

A. DAESH'S UTOPIA: THE CLAIM OF CALIPHATE

Acting with the goal of becoming the sole legitimate representative of all Muslims in the world, DAESH has followed a policy in line with that, naming itself "Islamic State" and declaring their leader as the so-called caliph. Later, the organization carried out heavy propaganda to ground the legitimacy of al-Baghdadi's caliphate upon classical Islamic literature and published books and brochures.⁶⁸ They quoted

⁶⁷ *Konstantiniyye*, 1436/3, p. 33.

⁶⁸ Osman b. Abdurrahman et-Temimi, *İlâmü'l-enâm bi milâdi devleti'l-İslam*, Ebu'-Zehrâ el-Eseri,

authors such as al-Mawardi and Abu Ya'la who helped develop the Sunni caliphate doctrine in the Abbasid period, and argued that the conditions specified in related literature were met by al-Baghdadi and the current form of DAESH was in total compliance with the criteria. On the other hand, other similar groups against DAESH argued based on the same sources that neither al-Baghdadi nor DAESH met the criteria in literature, and therefore their claim of caliphate had no validity whatsoever in religious terms.⁶⁹ Under said conditions, a family tree was compiled that tracing Baghdadi's lineage back to the Prophet (saw) through his grandson Husayn (RA)⁷⁰, by attributing significance to being member of Quraysh tribe. However, it has been revealed with evidence that it was fabricated to leave an impact on youth.⁷¹ Despite that, DAESH remains persistent on the subject, demanding submission from all Muslims and especially other similar groups. They declare in their publications that there are radical groups in North Africa and Caucasus which have declared obedience to DAESH. They brought up in a form of fatwa their claim that Taliban members who had obeyed Mullah Umar when he was alive should now obey al-Baghdadi. To justify their claim, they say that Mullah Umar was obeyed as a regional amir while al-Baghdadi is the caliph of all Muslims. The document in question also argues that Mullah Umar did not qualify for caliphate since he was not from Quraysh while al-Baghdadi is both from Quraysh and Ahl al-Bayt.⁷²

There is a wide consensus in the Ummah that Muslims must appoint a governor who will ensure public order and implement law. It has been disputed whether reason for this necessity in doctrine is due to religion or rational causes. The matter was handled in Kalam

el-Kavlü's-sâfi fî sihhati beyati's-şeyh selîli âli beyti'n-nübüvveti Ebî Bekr el-Kuraşî el-Huseynî el-Bağdâdî sümme es-Sâmerrâi; Türkî el-Binalî, *Müddü eydiküm li beyati'l-Bağdâdî*.

⁶⁹ Ebü Abdullâh Muhammed el-Mansûr, *ed-Devletü'l-İslamiyye beyne'l-hakika ve'l-vehm*, p. 3.

⁷⁰ Türkî el-Binalî, *Müddü eydiküm li beyati'l-Bağdâdî*, p. 1.

⁷¹ Salih Hüseyin er-Rakb, *ed-Devletü'l-İslamiyye (DEAŞ)*, p. 34-35; el-Hâşimî, *Tahzîru't-tâiş min dalâli Dâiş*, III, 296-305.

⁷² *Dabiq*, 1436/10, p. 18-24.

literature with regard to the disagreements between Ahl al-Sunnah and Kharijite and Shiite groups about qualities of a governor. Ahl al-Sunnah's approach on appointing a governor, also known as the matter of caliphate or imamate, became a systematic doctrine during the Abbasid era through authors like al-Mawardi who is frequently quoted by DAESH today. These authors developed a model considering the experience in the term of first four caliphs and the conditions of their era. Since it was not quite realistic, it lost its function in the Abbasid period and this was also pointed out in the doctrine. In that context, it was emphasized that the ideal model was able to survive for only thirty years after the Prophet (saw).⁷³ Governing the entire world of Islam by a single administrator was only kept alive in books as an ideal, and caliphate maintained its existence as a title until the first quarter of the 20th century.

DAESH's attempt to revive this model which has no equivalence today in real terms is an outcome of their goal to recruit supporters from similar groups and consolidating their own base by exploiting the charisma of the emphasis placed on caliphate and imamate (governing) in literature. From this point of view, it is a senseless act to even examine whether the structure DAESH put forward meets the conditions in the doctrine.

It was pointed out that the condition of being a Quraysh descendant, which was brought up by DAESH as a source of legitimacy for Baghdadi's compiled family tree, was because of Quraysh influence on society in the conjuncture of the period and therefore it is not binding for all periods.⁷⁴

It was stated by scholars that the condition lost its bindingness in the following eras which was addressed in works from as early as

73 Teftazânî, *Şerhu'l-Akâid*, Istanbul 1308, p. 181-182; Molla Kesteli, *Hâşiye alâ Şerhi'l-Akâid*, Istanbul 1308, p. 182-183.

74 Ibn Khaldun, *Muqaddimah*, p. 194-196.

the mid-era,⁷⁵ and that actions such as appointing a judge by a non-Qurayshi head of state would be legal.⁷⁶ It has been observed that to provide a religious basis for their utopia, DAESH uses hadith such as *“A person who dies when he does not obey dies a death of Jahiliyyah.”*⁷⁷ ⁷⁸ However, the ulama evaluated the narration considering the social reality and historical context and said that there was no state structure that provided public order in Arabs during Jahiliyyah, anyone who did not affiliate themselves with such a structure would be living in the conditions of the Jahiliyyah period, and the hadith brought up this issue.⁷⁹

Pragmatically using quotes from the classical literature to justify Baghdadi’s declaration of caliphate, DAESH defends that al-Baghdadi became a caliph by obtaining the allegiance of some from the group of governors and elites named Ahl al-Hall wa’l-Aqd. On the other hand, they justify Baghdadi’s rule in occupied territories, where the people have not pledged allegiance, with quotes about the legitimacy of the usurper.⁸⁰ Evaluations on allegiance in literature were made assuming that Muslims lived under the roof of a single state. The evaluations about the usurper’s rule are a product of preventing chaos and anarchy during periods when it was practically impossible to live under a single rule. It is not in any way something to be taken seriously that someone controlling a limited territory with an armed force of merely tens of thousands requests obedience from billions of Muslims by quoting the conditions in literature. Baghdadi’s claim is without merit even based on the criteria of classical literature. To give an example, according to Al-Ghazali, someone who claims to

75 Heyet, *el-Fetâve’l-Hindiyye*, Beirut 1986, III, 317; Seyyid Bey, *Hilâfet ve Hâkimiyet-i Milliye*, Ankara 1339, p. 20-23.

76 Tarsûsî, *Tuhfetü’l-Türk fî mâ yecibu en yu’mel fi’l-mülk*, Beirut 1992, p. 63-65.

77 Muslim, “İmarah”, 13.

78 Osman b. Abdurrahman et-Temîmî, *İlâmü’l-enâm bi milâdi devleti’l-İslam*, p. 39, 87.

79 Molla Kesteli, *Hâşiye alâ Şerhi’l-Akâid*, p. 181.

80 Türki el-Binalî, *Müddü eydiküm li beyati’l-Bağdâdi*, p. 4-5.

be caliph without garnering the support of majority of Muslims is a rebel, and sanction must be imposed to have him surrender to truth.⁸¹

One of DAESH's contradictions on the issue is that in order to support their thesis in some points, they cite works that completely refute their claim. As a matter of fact, a quote they took from Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab says that, Muslims could not unite under the rule of a single imam since Ahmad ibn Hanbal, therefore the decisions of a person who rules over a couple of regions should be considered valid like a legitimate imam.⁸² What they quoted clearly refutes DAESH's claim to be the caliph of all Muslims. On the other hand, their arguments about the invalidity of zakat, prayer, fasting, and Hajj without a caliph, an attempt to emphasize the significance of this post, lacks any fiqh basis.⁸³ Another evidence for the lack of any merit in this claim is the fact that even Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, DAESH's reference source, stated the opposite on the subject.⁸⁴ Disregarding such a reference is another indication of their lack of principle and distortion of sources they rely on.

B. DAR AL-ISLAM AND DAR AL-HARB

The concepts dar al-Islam (abode of Islam) and dar al-harb (abode of war) point out to the order developed by Muslim jurists to make sense of the international system in terms of Islamic principles as the system constituted the basis for rules of war and peace during the birth of Islam and in the Early Medieval period. They were used to describe the relations between Muslim countries and non-Muslim countries in the world conjuncture of the time. Generally, dar al-

81 Gazzālī, *İhyâu ulûmi'd-dîn*, İstanbul 1985, I, 120-121; Kemal b. Ebi Şerif, *Kitâbü'l-Müsâmere*, p. 280.

82 Türki el-Binalî, *Müddü eydiküm li beyati'l-Bağdâdi*, p. 5. For this expression see *ed-Düreri's-seniyye fi'l-ecvibeti'n-Necdiyye*, IX, 5.

83 Osman b. Abdurrahman et-Temimî, *İ'lâmü'l-enâm bi milâdi devleti'l-İslam*, p. 39; Ebu Abdullah Muhammed el-Mansûr, *ed-Devletü'l-İslamiyye beyne'l-hakika ve'l-vehm*, p. 19.

84 *ed-Düreri's-seniyye fi'l-ecvibeti'n-Necdiyye*, IX, 5.

Islam referred to countries “under Muslim rule” and dar al-harb referred to countries “under non-Muslim rule”. The international order facilitated by these two concepts in the early centuries of Islam gradually changed over time and terms like *dar al-'ahd*, *dar al-sulh*, *dar al-muwada'a*, and *dar al-zimmah* were developed for countries that had treaties with Muslims. In other words, new developments in terms of war and peace in Muslim - Non-Muslim international relations and the gradual increase of cohabitation caused changes in this dual distinction. For example, Muslim scholars were occupied with the question of which category was suitable for the countries where the Mongols had political rule after the Mongol invasion but the Muslim public practiced a considerable portion of Sharia rulings. Fatwas issued by Hanafi jurists for Khwarezm and Mawara al-Nahr,⁸⁵ and by Ibn Taymiyyah for Mardin⁸⁶ reflect the painful process we are pointing out. Introducing these concepts to our day, although they lost their function in explaining international relations in the following periods, and handling today's international order with the separation of dar al-harb and dar al-Islam in classical fiqh is not a healthy approach. As a matter of fact, Islamic jurists studying on the subject say that the concepts in question must be updated considering the current international legal, political, and commercial relations as well as the political structures of Islamic countries.⁸⁷

Claiming to be the sole legitimate representative of Muslims under the name of “Islamic State”, DAESH uses the contrast of dar al-harb and dar al-Islam, and invites all Muslims to immigrate to the so-called land of caliphate under their rule which is the only place in the world where Allah's decrees are implemented. They say that those who do not immigrate and continue to live in regions of shirk are committing a sin as they do not have any justifiable excuse. They also condemn

85 Bezzāzī, *el-Fetāve'l-Bezzāziyye*, Beirut 1986, VI, 311-312.

86 Ibn Taymiyyah, *el-Fetāve'l-kübrâ*, Beirut 1987, III, 532-533.

87 Ahmet Özel, *Islam ve Terör*, Istanbul 2007, p. 79-80.

those who have escaped the Islamic state and taken shelter at refugee camps in various countries for choosing a life of abasement. According to DAESH, which argues that Iraq was once dar al-Islam but it has become dar al-harb due to invasion of apostates, the borders of dar al-harb will shrink as the “Islamic State” grows stronger.⁸⁸ As is seen, DAESH considers dar al-Islam limited in regions under their rule, and exploits this fiqh concept to fortify their own strategy.

C. DEFILING THE CONCEPT OF JIHAD

An Islamic concept, jihad is used to mean a person’s use of their maximum effort to fight the enemy. While meaning combating the belligerent enemy in war with Islam and Muslims, jihad also means fighting the devil, keeping away from sins, and fighting desires. The verse “Strive for Allah (practice jihad) as you are supposed to.” (Hajj, 22/78) incorporates all of the aforementioned meanings. There are expressions in the hadith of the Prophet (saw) that confirm and elaborate on them.⁸⁹ Therefore, aside from fighting the enemy, many other topics are included within the framework of jihad such as disciplining one’s self, learning knowledge, teaching religion to people, and warning a governor that commits.

While accepting the comprehensive use of jihad, DAESH prioritizes the part they call “the fighting jihad” which refers to clashing with the enemy. They include all groups against them in enemy category, disregarding whether they are Muslim or not. According to their approach, those who live in lands of idolaters after the foundation of Islamic state and declaration of “caliphate” are in the wrong even though they claim to be doing a jihad of invitation by telling people about Islam. The devil deludes believers by deceiving them into thinking they have accomplished the jihad with acts of invitation to

⁸⁸ Osman b. Abdurrahman et-Temimî, *Îlâmü'l-enâm bi milâdi devleti'l-İslam*, p. 64.

⁸⁹ Râgıb el-İsfehâni, *el-Müfredât fî garîbi'l-Kur'an*, Mekke undated, I, 132; Tirmidhi, *Fadhail al-Jihad*, 2; Abu Dawud, *Jihad*, 17.

Islam, financial aid, disciplining the self, and learning knowledge. All these acts fall within jihad and anyone who does not partake in the fighting jihad despite being strong enough is a sinner who has abandoned their obligation. According to DAESH, *“wiping shirk away from the face of the earth and making tawhid prevail over the world does not and will not happen by invitation. The jihad of invitation is done until the state is founded. Then, regions are captured by war and the people are invited afterwards. Spreading of tawhid essentially happened through wars. Those do not immigrate to the Islamic State, live in lands of disbelievers, and call themselves inviters should know that they have become both deviant and sinner for abandoning the sunnah of the Messenger of Allah and his Companions and for abstaining from the fighting jihad.”*⁹⁰ Then, the right thing to be done for a person who wants to join the jihad is to enter into the service of “Islamic State” and perform tasks assigned by it. If they are assigned with the duty to do jihad by invitation to train the new recruits, they will not be held responsible for leaving the fighting jihad, on the contrary, they will have accomplished both jihads.⁹¹ As is seen, according to DAESH, the only way to fulfill the obligation of jihad, a Qur'anic concept, is to enter into their service and actively participate in their operations.

It is understood that all these claims are based on DAESH's assumption to be the only legitimate government representing Muslims. By doing that, they put themselves in the place of the first Muslim State which was founded by Our Beloved Prophet (saw) in Medina and grew and developed during the Rashidun era. However, as personally stated by our Prophet (saw) in hadith, the caliphate is limited to the era of al-Khulafa al-Rashidun; in later periods, the political understanding and practices of Muslims became different and there was never a single political roof again. Even though Islamic

⁹⁰ *Konstantiniyye*, 1436/3, p. 30.

⁹¹ *Konstantiniyye*, 1436/3, p. 28.

scholars adopted the political principles standing out in the practices of 'Asr al-Sa'adah and al-Khulafa al-Rashidun as a guide to themselves, they never turned it into a claim to bring all Muslims under one roof. In that sense, scholars of Islam never deemed the role of sole representative for Muslims fit for any Muslim state and nor did any state see themselves in that position. Changing political conditions and atmosphere requires certain principles of Islam to be re-interpreted based on time and place. The general rule in Islam's fiqh "the changes of time affect changes in rules" is an important principle formulated to state that such decrees bound by the conditions and customs of the time will change as the said customs and conditions change as well. The political and international system is a field designated by conditions and customs; especially the relations between Muslim and non-Muslim states may change in line with the rule of reciprocity which stood out in practices of Umar (RA). And when the peace process becomes an integral part of the international system like it is today, the black and white categories like dar al-Islam and dar al-harb may lose their sense. Moreover, the system in question has enabled Muslims to tell humankind about the universal message of Islam in a way never seen before in history. It has allowed Muslims to bring Islam's supreme values to the hearts and lives of all people. Thanks to the principle of "al-amr bi al-ma'ruf wa al-nahy an al-munkar" (enjoining good and forbidding wrong), which is the basis of jihad, Muslims today have obtained a great opportunity for invitation to eliminate all the inequality, injustice, and wrongdoing in the world and instill the awareness of being a Muslim into people again. However, this movement of savagery and violence which reflects Islam's universal message to masses as a danger does not carry out jihad; on the contrary, they are the biggest obstacle in front of jihad. If the real purpose of jihad is to make Islam enter the hearts of all people and therefore ensure that the divine message and religious awareness are effective on the earth, then it is obvious that an invitation made

by intimidation and tyranny will never serve this cause and instead hinder the jihad.

Furthermore, attacks on a Muslim community cannot be called jihad in Islam. It is also not permissible to kill captives, non-combatants, messengers, and press members considered as messengers. DAESH's numerous unacceptable abuses of rights in the armed attacks they carried out under the name of jihad have led to their exploitation of an Islamic concept such as jihad in line with their own interests. The real distressing point in this context is that the words, the practices, and the Book communicated by a Prophet (saw) sent as grace to the worlds have been used as an instrument to justify an organization's terrorist actions.

D. THE MODERN PRACTICE THAT DISCREDITS MARTYRDOM: ISTISHHAD

Suicide attacks that are called istishhad (martyrdom) in the literature of revolutionist/salafi radical groups are among the virtuous, lawful acts according to DAESH. While they covered the issue in their periodicals,⁹² they also published a separate booklet on it.⁹³ They quoted many times from fiqh literature to use as a basis for this action. However, the quoted issues are about attacking the much stronger enemy despite a high risk of death. It was deemed permissible during a battle by many scholars in classical fiqh literature on the premise that it could be a source of motivation for Muslims.⁹⁴ In other words, the legality is only valid when it is actually used against the enemy during a battle. The action called istishhad today is entirely different. Aware of the fact that their actions do not exactly fit the issues covered

⁹² *Konstantiniyye*, 1436/3, p. 32-44.

⁹³ Ebu'l-Hasen el-Filistîni, *Rudûd ve telmîhât alâ münkirî'l-ameliyyât*. (<https://ia601007.us.archive.org/2/items/hmm-rdd/rdd.pdf>)

⁹⁴ Serahsî, *Şerhu's-Siyerî'l-kebir*, Beirut 1997, I, 115; Cessâs, *Ahkâmü'l-Kur'an*, Beirut 1992, I, 327-328.

in literature, DAESH developed an argument saying that nobody should dwell on the surface of issues and even though there is not any uniformity between acts deemed lawful by classical scholars and the istishhad acts, there is similarity in terms of goals and motive. The reason for defending the actions is that they work in terms of their expansion strategy. In their own words, “Istishhadi operations have opened the door for most of the conquests of the Islamic state. Islamic State is the only state in the world that has this unprecedented quality. Thousands of the lions of caliphate are waiting for their turn to perform this deed in both the Islamic State and other countries.”⁹⁵

Saving a life is one of the fundamental principles of Islam. In that context, it is understood from the related verses in the Holy Qur'an⁹⁶ that a person does not have the right to end another person's life unless they have a rightful and legitimate reason. Similarly, nobody can end their own life, which has been entrusted to them. Areas in which immunity of the right to life can be bended are limited to execution of a punishment by judicial decision, and wartime. There are also certain rules as to conditions that deem a war legitimate and actions that can be carried out within the war. The Holy Qur'an describes who to fight in verses *“Fight in the way of Allah with those who fight with you, and do not exceed the limits, surely Allah does not love those who exceed the limits.”* (Baqarah, 2/190) and *“Allah does not forbid you respecting those who have not made war against you on account of your religion, and have not driven you forth from your homes, that you show them kindness and deal with them justly; surely Allah loves the doers of justice. Allah only forbids you respecting those who made war upon you on account of your religion, and drove you forth from your homes and those who backed up others in your expulsion, that you make friends with them...”* (Mumtahanah, 60/8-9) To broach the issue in light of these verses, it is not possible to call

⁹⁵ *Konstantiniyye*, 1436/3, p. 43.

⁹⁶ Isra, 17/33; Nisa, 4/33; Baqarah, 2/195.

an act “martyrdom” and deem it to be lawful when it causes the death of innocent and sinless Muslims, women, and children.⁹⁷

Carrying out these attacks in non-Muslim countries also cannot be deemed permissible. A Muslim temporarily residing in a non-Muslim country must refrain from hostile behavior and attitude that may violate his agreement as long as they live there even when a war breaks out between that country and his native one.⁹⁸

Indeed, the Prophet (saw) forbade the killing of women, children, elderly, and non-combatant civilians even during wartime. The main principle here is the immunity of human life. It can only be suspended in the event of close contact in a battle. The main principle applies to women, children, non-combatants, and civilians that are not preparing for war.⁹⁹ The cruelty toward Muslims in various parts of the world and the violation of their most fundamental rights cannot be justification for actions that will take away the right to life from innocent people who have not actually partaken in the oppression.

As a matter of fact, Alija Izetbegovic did not allow any reprisal for the abuse of Muslims’ rights during the Bosnian war. His following statements shed light on the essence of this issue:

“As you see, Allah has put us through a difficult test. Our people are being strangled, our women and children are killed, our mosques are being burnt down. And we neither want to kill their women and children nor burn down their churches. We don’t want that, because it is not our style despite some exceptions. There are some soldiers here and I have the chance to say it to them. This is a message we need to communicate to everyone. We will prevail because we have respect for the other religion, the other nation, and the other political stance. Because we are trying to be democrats in

⁹⁷ Heyet, *Sorularla İslam*, p. 146-150.

⁹⁸ Muhammed Hamidullah, *İslam’da Devlet İdaresi*, transl. Kemal Kuşçu, Ankara undated, p. 207-208.

⁹⁹ İbn Dakik el-İd, *İhkâmü’l-ahkâm*, Beirut undated, IV, p. 236.

these grueling times. Because we are reasonable and honest people. In fact, damaging any sacred item is expressly forbidden to us. Even though Turks ruled Serbia for four centuries, Decani, Gracanica, and Sopocani monasteries are still intact thanks to this ban. Turks did not cause any damage here. Because the book we believe in rejects such destruction.”¹⁰⁰

It is understood that DAESH has distorted jihad in a way to make it seem like a terror concept of modern times. Indeed, the idea that terror is the weapon of the oppressed and they have been pushed into this method by the wrongdoers who have violated all of their legal rights is an argument they developed to make the actions of terror groups seem innocent. The following verses must be contemplated carefully to define the Muslim attitude on the issue: *“O you who have believed, be persistently standing firm for Allah, witness in justice, and do not let the hatred of a people prevent you from being just. Be just; that is nearer to righteousness. And fear Allah; indeed, Allah is Acquainted with what you do.”*(Ma'idah, 5/8). *“And the retribution for an evil act is an evil one like it, but whoever pardons and makes reconciliation - his reward is [due] from Allah. Indeed, He does not like wrongdoers.”* (Shura, 42/40). Therefore, neither the brutal attacks that shed blood in our country nor the murders committed anywhere in the world can be called “martyrdom”.

E. “SINCE WHEN DID YOU ENSLAVE FREE-BORN PEOPLE?”

All Muslims should shout out this sentence, said by Umar (RA) to warn his governors, in the face of DAESH today. Because as it is known, the important thing in Islam is that all people be free. However, the humankind was inured to slavery throughout history

¹⁰⁰ Aliya İzzetbegović, *Konuşmalar*, transl. Fatmanur Altun-Rifat Ahmetoğlu, Istanbul 2007, p. 25-26.

and legalized it as a brutal consequence of war. Even though there is no verse in the Holy Qur'an preaching the enslavement of people, Islamic jurisprudence did not abolish the slavery system perhaps within the framework of international rule of reciprocity. Instead, Islam encouraged the emancipation of slaves through various means, decreed a portion from government income to be allocated for emancipation, and imposed it as a sanction in cases of penance, and thus aimed to minimize slavery in social life at every opportunity. Muslim jurists consider slavery as an arrangement about captives because it was seen as an outcome of war at the time. For that reason, the source of slavery in Islam was only reduced to being a prisoner of war. Emancipating them for a fee or without charge was also encouraged (Muhammad, 47/4). Enslaving a free person was harshly criticized in hadith and verses.

As observed by researchers, including many Westerners, who studied slavery, Islamic teachings brought treatment of slaves to a much more humane manner. Indeed, Muslims did not subject their slaves to harsh treatment like in the Western world, they regarded them as a member of their families. Therefore, slaves in Islamic societies blended with the community, preventing the emergence of a separate class or ghettoization. When humankind elevated enough to abolish slavery, the developments were adopted by Muslim communities as well. Ottoman Sultans, rulers of the greatest Islamic state at the time, made legal arrangements to abolish slavery.¹⁰¹ A late Ottoman period jurist, Mahmud Esad Efendi, underscored the legal arrangements regarding the issue and the sensitivity shown by the Shaykh al-Islam saying, *"Only a couple of years ago, the Shaykh al-Islam performed his religious duty by immediately dismissing a local judge who turned out to have auctioned off a slave from an estate. Because it would be a betrayal to the Shari'ah to appoint a person devoid of*

101 Bülent Tahiroğlu, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Kölelik", *İÜHFİM*, 1979-1981/1-4, p. 649-676.

*the sufficient knowledge to appreciate that there is no slavery today in the path described by Islam.”*¹⁰²

Abolishment of slavery is in compliance with the fundamental objectives of Islam. Therefore, prisoners of war today cannot be made slaves. In that case, having sexual intercourse with captive women cannot be acceptable in any way according to Islamic rulings.¹⁰³ On the contrary, it must be viewed as adultery and rape.

Disregarding the general goals and purposes of Islam and overlooking the historical and social context of hadith and verses, DAESH persecuted the harmless Yazidi community who had not participated in the war, and enslaved the captured Yazidi women. These helpless people were distributed among militants as concubines. A slave market was set up to sell them. And they introduced it as *“reclamation of an unapplied religious ruling.”*

*“We are here today, and we are reviving a prophetic practice buried by Arab and non-Arab enemies of Allah. By Allah, we have brought it back with the sharp edge of the sword; we did not do it with passivism, negotiations, democracy or elections. We did it by the prophetic method, with blood-red swords, not with fingers that cast votes or send tweets!”*¹⁰⁴

The organization prepared a brochure for its militants, compiled from information in fiqh books that had been written in the period when slavery was in effect.¹⁰⁵ It includes information about practices regarding concubines in thirty two questions. The organization argues that slave markets will be set up despite all obstacles and even the wives of some Western leaders will be sold there.¹⁰⁶ They aim to turn it into an instrument of challenging global powers.

¹⁰² Mahmud Esad b. Emîn Seydişehirî, *Târih-i İlm-i Hukuk*, Istanbul 1331, p. 234 (footnote: 1).

¹⁰³ Ahmet Özel, “Esir”, *DİA*, XI, 385.

¹⁰⁴ *Dabiq*, 1436/9, p. 47.

¹⁰⁵ *Suâl ve cevâb fi's-sebyi ve'r-rikâb*, Divânü'l-buhûs ve'l-ifâtâ, 1436. (https://ia902703.us.archive.org/4/items/Reqap03/Reqap_03.pdf)

¹⁰⁶ *Dabiq*, 1436/9, p. 49.

Despite the abolishment of slavery and the consensus on the issue among the entire humankind including Muslims, what DAESH does is nothing but enslaving people by force. According to the Prophet (saw), the enemy of a person who commits such an act will be Allah Almighty on the Day of Judgment.¹⁰⁷ It is an attitude that complies with the “spoils” understanding of the tribe mentality from Jahiliyya period, which fails to comprehend the primary goals and intention of Islam. The fact that DAESH uses it to allure foreign militants and teenagers from the world of Islam is one of the most evident examples proving their problematic view on religion.¹⁰⁸

F. DAESH'S TOOLS OF INTIMIDATION: BEHEADING, TORTURE, AND GENOCIDE

DAESH's use of torturing, tormenting, and terrorizing methods while executing their victims has the aim of intimidation and propaganda. It is done on purpose. The executions are recorded on video and announced to the whole world through social media and their periodicals. This strategy is based on a planned choice. Because modern societies are sterile, so to say, in terms of violence. In other words, people do not witness death and blood personally. DAESH focuses on that point, aiming to spread the sense of fear and horror on masses by circulating the execution videos as much as possible. They even published a special booklet to defend the justification of this action.¹⁰⁹

The booklet argues that the torture committed by America and Israel and the people they murdered are overlooked, and the group's executions are criticized instead; it complains that Islam has been

¹⁰⁷ Bukhari, “Buyu”, 106, “Ijarah”, 10.

¹⁰⁸ Salih Hüseyin er-Rakb, *ed-Devletü'l-İslamiyye (DEAŞ)*, p. 162.

¹⁰⁹ Hüseyin b. Mahmüd, *Meseletü kat'i'r-ruûs (câizetun bi nassi'l-Kur'an ve's-sünne ve fi'li's-sahâbe)*, 2014/1426.

rendered meaningless, and that's why a generation oblivious of fighting and beheading is growing up.¹¹⁰

According to the organization, decapitating the disbelievers is not what defames Islam. What makes Islam degenerate is the efforts of people who are trying to turn this religion into a philosophical system similar to teachings of Mandela and Gandhi in which killing, fighting, beheading, and shedding blood do not exist. The understanding they are trying to establish bears no relation to the religion of Muhammad ibn Abdullah (saw), who was sent with a sword before the Day of Reckoning. According to DAESH, "Islam is a religion of force, a religion of fighting, a religion of jihad, a religion of beheading, a religion of spilling blood. It is not a religion of turning the left cheek when you get hit on the right one. On the contrary, it is the religion of breaking the hand that reaches to despise the Muslim!"¹¹¹

As religious basis for decapitation, they brought up the verse "*When you meet those who disbelieve in battle, strike their necks!*"... (Muhammad, 47/4) as well as certain practices of the Prophet (saw) and the Companions. Even though the phrase "strike their necks" is a metaphor about killing the enemy in close contact according to tafsir experts.¹¹² DAESH chose to understand it in the literal sense, fitting their tradition of decontextualizing Qur'an's verses and distorting them to get what they want. As for examples given about practices in narrations, the least painful method used to be implemented in death penalty at the time. However, what DAESH does is like killing innocent people like strangling an animal. It is neither Islamic nor humane. This was first implemented in the history of Islam by the Kharijites; they murdered Abdullah, son of the Companion Khabbab ibn al-Aratt, by slitting his throat.¹¹³ DAESH follows the same method

110 Hüseyin b. Mahmûd, *Meseletü kat'i'r-ruûs*, p. 4-5.

111 Hüseyin b. Mahmûd, *Meseletü kat'i'r-ruûs*, p. 17.

112 For example, see Âlûsî, *Rûhu'l-meânî*, XIII, p. 196.

113 Mubarrad, *al-Kamil fil-luga wal-adab*, III, 49.

in their actions for intimidation. Regarding the Jordanian pilot they burnt to death, they said in their publications that it was carried out in retaliation and based on maslaha.¹¹⁴ What they call maslaha is the contribution that the related action will make to their intended image. Beyond DAESH's individual tortures, they commit mass massacres and genocides on people against them regardless of religion; this is a crime against humanity all by itself and Islam can never accept it.

Because Islam has forbidden torture and cruelty toward any creature without reason. Therefore, the Prophet (saw) who was sent as grace to the worlds did not allow live animals to be used as targets in shooting practice, he commanded the least painful method to be used even when slaughtering an animal. Torturing prisoners of war and dismembering dead enemy soldiers, are absolutely banned. In the execution of qisas punishment, the use of a sword was adopted as the least painful method under conditions of the time; even when the victim was burnt to death, applying the same on the murderer was not allowed. Because the point here is not to torture the criminal, it is to execute their punishment within legal criteria.¹¹⁵

G. ANOTHER FORM OF DISTORTION: REDUCING ISLAM TO CORPORAL PUNISHMENT

Claiming to be the single legitimate representative of all Muslims, DAESH puts forward the enforcement of hadd punishment as evidence for their legitimacy. They use it especially as a means of propaganda against members of other opposing groups, calling them to abandon their group and join the "Islamic State". According to the group, if

¹¹⁴ *Dabiq*, 1436/7, p. 7.

¹¹⁵ Ömer Nasuhi Bilmen, *Hukuk-ı İslamiyye ve Istilahât-ı Fıkhiyye Kamusu*, İstanbul 1950, III, 103.

they do not answer this call and choose to fight the “Islamic State” they will face the danger of becoming disbelievers without realizing it:

“Similarly, we renew our call to groups in Damascus and Libya. And we invite them to think before fighting the Islamic state that rules with the rule of Allah. O the captivated! Remember before you fight with the Islamic state that there is no place on the earth except the land of the Islamic state where people rule by Allah’s rule and the rule only belongs to Allah. Remember that if you capture an inch of this land, a village or a city, Allah’s law will turn into law of the humans there. And ask yourself: What is the verdict on those who abolish the rule of Allah and bring the rule of humans or on those who contribute to it? Yes, you will have committed shirk. Avoid it! By fighting the Islamic state, you will commit shirk in ways you know or do not.”¹¹⁶

The factors that the group show as reason for their success include stoning adulterers to death, killing magicians, cutting the arm of thieves, and whipping the consumers of alcohol.¹¹⁷ Videos of executions are also featured in periodicals.

Hadd penalties are physical and heavy forms of punishment aiming to accomplish certain goals. As put by Sarakhsi, *“Sanctions imposed in the world are enforcements of social content legitimized for the good of people. Qisas aims to protect the right to life, punishment for adultery aims to protect the reputation of posterity and family honor, the punishment for theft aims to ensure safety of property, the punishment for slander aims to preserve honor and dignity, and the punishment for intoxication aims to protect the mind.”¹¹⁸*

Hadd punishments are deterrent sanctions intending to accomplish the specified maslaha. As they are heavy punishments, there are quite harsh conditions for proving the crime and any suspicion is evaluated

¹¹⁶ *Konstantiniyye*, 1436/2, p. 38.

¹¹⁷ *Konstantiniyye*, 1436/1, p. 17.

¹¹⁸ Sarakhsi, *el-Mebsût*, X, 110.

in favor of the suspect. This attitude is based¹¹⁹ on the Prophet's (saw) statements¹²⁰ foreseeing "hadd punishments to be reduced by suspicion when possible" and "it is better to err in forgiving than err in punishing". In addition, based on the 34th verse of Surah al-Ma'idah, it is accepted by some fiqh schools that a repentance to be made with effective remorse will reduce the penalty. It demonstrates that enforcement of hadd penalty is not the goal but the means. The primary objective is not to punish the criminal but to make them aware what they have done is evil, rehabilitate them, and have them rectify the situation. On the other hand, starting from the stage of enforcing penalties without making the arrangements to prevent said crimes in society will lead to outcomes that are not in line with the purposes of religion. In that context, it should be remembered as a law of fiqh, "*A decree deemed lawful to bring benefit becomes void if it entails the opposite of that benefit in practice.*"¹²¹ In other words, "implementing a ruling deemed lawful to reach a certain goal becomes null if it produces the opposite result." In fact, Umar (RA) did not enforce the penalty of cutting off a thief's hand during the year of famine. Similarly, he did not cut off the hands of slaves who had stolen a camel out of starvation; he made their owner pay twice the camel's price.¹²² The motive that ensures its accomplishment is that it is interpreted together with the related verse, other evidence, and the general purposes of religion.

Introducing strict criteria in fiqh literature to determine committal of crimes which require hadd penalty restricted the possibility of enforcing those punishments in history. Indeed, scholars point out that rajm (stoning) penalty was not in practice since the early centuries of Islam.¹²³ The harshness of criteria put forward in fiqh books, ascribing

119 Tirmidhi, "Hudud", 2.

120 Ibn al-Humam, *Fath al-Qadir*, IV, 116.

121 Kürlânî, *el-Kifâye*, Beirut 1986, II, 202; Seyyid Bey, *Medhal*, Istanbul 1333, p. 17.

122 Muvattâ, "Akdiye", 28; Zûrkânî, *Şerhu'l-Muvattâ*, Egypt 1310, III, 212.

123 Ibn Kuteybe, *el-İhtilâf fi'l-lafz ve'r-redd ale'l-Cehmiyye ve'l-Müşebbihe*, Beirut 1985, p. 10.

a very determining role to suspicion in proving hadd crimes, the lack of necessary conditions, and similar reasons led to replacing these punishments with other penalties for the related crimes. At the same time, the other punishments under the scope of tazir (punishment not specified in the Qur'an or hadith but imposed at the discretion of judges) were compiled into a code of laws in the Ottoman Empire; and scholars of Islam confirmed their compliance with Islam. The same approach is seen in the penal codes of Afghanistan today.¹²⁴

In consideration of the aforementioned data, DAESH's claim of enforcing hadd punishment cannot be viewed as something in accordance with principles of Islamic law. Contrarily, it is clear that their actual goal is not to enforce Islam but to use these punishments as a means of intimidation for their own rule. These punishments are implemented to reinforce their authority and intimidate the population in any region; many people they want to execute are accused with a crime that requires hadd penalty, and they make them acknowledge and confess the crime by torture.¹²⁵

¹²⁴ Mehterkhan Khwajamir, *Afganistan'da İslam Ceza Hukukunun Kanunlaştırılması*, N.E. Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Konya 2015, p. 161, 284 (unpublished doctoral dissertation).

¹²⁵ Salih Hüseyin er-Rakb, *ed-Devletü'l-İslamiyye (DEAŞ)*, p. 59, 146-155.

IV. GROUPS PERSECUTED BY DAESH

Practices of DAESH with the claim of being the Islamic state have brought damage on many individuals and groups particularly the religion of Islam itself and Muslims. Some of them will be covered in short below.

A. ISLAM AND MUSLIMS

DAESH's actions have damaged the religion of Islam itself before anything. The last message of Allah Almighty, which He communicated through his last messenger and which aimed "taking people out of darkness into the light", has begun to be perceived as a source that feeds terrorist movements as a result of the actions and statements of DAESH and similar groups. It has paved the way for the reinforcement of anti-Islamic perspectives and sentiments called "Islamophobia".

The group adopts a closed structure and the process of its emergence and growth cannot be easily explained under ordinary conditions. They have made all Muslim minorities in the world, especially Muslims living in the West, into the target of anti-Islamic movements. These Muslims are almost afraid to leave their home out of fear; they have even lost the convenience of feeling safe at their own homes. Racism and xenophobia have been fueled at this stage. When Islam comes to people's mind, they now think of the violent execution videos of DAESH which defines Islam as a "religion of beheading", instead of the exemplary personality of the Prophet (saw) and the merciful and healing power of Qur'an.

In terms of the Middle East, the organization has caused people to lose their lives, their property, their homes, and their homeland. Beyond that, it has given global powers a reason to be involved in the region in a more active way. The legitimacy of independence struggles and searches for freedom by people in the region against invaders has come to be questioned as a result of groups like DAESH. Radical bodies that know nothing about the history, cultural sensitivities, and diversity of the region and that sided against those over time also eliminated local dynamics of resistance or debilitated their rightful struggle.¹²⁶ Having inflicted tremendous damage on Islam and Muslims of the world, even if DAESH's current organization were brought down, there is still the risk of similar groups sprouting as long as the conditions that set the ground for the group's growth are still there.

B. AHL AL-KITAB (PEOPLE OF THE BOOK)

DAESH forced Christian Arabs to make a choice between converting to Islam, paying tribute or getting slaughtered by sword. In this case, many people had to escape, leaving their homeland. The groups in question are those which have been living inside the Islamic community for nearly fourteen centuries and which have been secured for a long time. They have never assumed a hostile attitude toward Muslims. DAESH destroyed their temples and in some places looted their houses and property. These communities have lived there for thousands of years, and even defended the land together with Muslims against foreign invaders. Unable to comprehend the nature of this situation, the organization imposed tribute which is prescribed in books to be taken from non-Muslims, and made mistakes in the rule to be enforced. Because as is understood from Umar's (RA) practice, the taxes to be received from non-Muslims who have joined the

¹²⁶ See on the matter Muhammed Cihad Ebrâî, *(İŞ)İD Çerçeve Metni*, p. 40.

Islamic community with an agreement can only be determined by a separate contract.¹²⁷ Matters like this are issues that Islam leaves to the public authority to decide and asks them to be arranged depending on conditions and type of affair. DAESH adopted them in the way they were implemented in history, enforced them in exactly the same way without any regard for today's changing conditions, and presented it as reviving a command of Islam which is contrary to purpose of Islam.

C. YAZIDIS

Yazidis are among the groups that DAESH persecuted by committing a terrible crime against humanity. This group was not in a hostile attitude towards neither Muslims nor DAESH, but they did not offer them any options other than converting to Islam or getting killed. However, scholars of Islam have deemed it lawful for centuries that this community, like the Majusi, live within the Muslim community having the same rights as Ahl al-Kitab (People of the Book).¹²⁸ Despite that, hundreds of Yazidis were murdered as a result of DAESH attacks, and the rest were forced to leave their homeland. Enslaving the captured Yazidi women, treating them like concubines, and selling them at slave markets – as previously covered - is a practice without any religious basis.

D. WOMEN

DAESH practically put women under house arrest in areas they captured. They did not even let them go out for education. Women were also forced to completely draw away from work life. The organization did not deem the outfits for covering sufficient, and imposed the clothing they designed. They published brochures demonstrating the required form of clothing, and also argued that it is not lawful for

¹²⁷ Mevslî, *el-İhtiyâr*, Beirut 1975, I, 115.

¹²⁸ Hâsimî, *Tahzîru't-tâiș min dalâli Dâiș*, III, 367-368; *Risâle Meftûha*, p. 17.

women to unveil their faces.¹²⁹ The most extreme attack on freedom of women is forcing them to marry DAESH members under pressure.¹³⁰ However, the Prophet (saw) did not even consider the marriage of a girl valid who was forced by her father to marry a man she did not want.¹³¹ It is another example of persecution against women that they are compelled to marry another person to be specified by the organization in the event the initial one dies in combat.

E. CHILDREN

DAESH puts children, whom they call “lions of tomorrow”, under special training to raise them with the so-called jihad spirit. They sometimes have children carry out executions, and the photographs are posted on their media organs.¹³² DAESH responded to criticism on the issue saying that using child soldiers is sunnah of the Prophet (saw). However, prior to the Battle of Uhud the Prophet (saw) turned down some Companions who wanted to fight in the battle voluntarily, saying that they were underage.¹³³ It is clear that having children carry out executions will adversely affect their mental health and cause a tendency to violence in them. It resembles the un-Islamic and inhumane practices of certain brutal terror groups in Africa such as recruiting child soldiers. It is an interesting example that demonstrates DAESH is actually a modern terrorist organization. In that context, the following observation on violent tendencies of Western-born young members is quite striking: *“Joining the jihad and the rebels was an adventure for many young Westerners, a sort of military summer camp. They were the most dangerous ones because they did not have affection for the locals and did not care about their pain.”*¹³⁴

129 *Afâif fi hicâb ve Edilletü vucûbi setri'l-mer'e.*

130 Hâşimî, *Tahzîru't-Tâiş min dalâli Dâiş*, III, 367; *Risâle meftûha*, p. 18-19.

131 Abu Dawud, “Nikah”, 23,24; Ibn Majah, “Nikah”, 12; Mevslî, *el-İhtiyâr*, III, p. 91.

132 *Dabîq*, 1436/8, p. 20-21.

133 Abdüsselam Harun, *Tehzîbü Sîreti İbn Hişâm*, Beirut 2014, p. 128.

134 Loretta Napoleoni, *İslam ve Modern Cihat*, transl. F. Çeçen – A.F. Çeçen, Istanbul 2014, p. 96.

DAESH's inclusion of children in executions and combat already means that they are in a sense training their own members who are prone to violence. However, exposing children, who are entrusted to the entire ummah, to such environments causes great suffering.

EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A radical organization trying to justify itself with literalist-salafi style, DAESH has become a threat not only on a regional but also a global level. Despite being few in number, the participation in the group from Turkey is also a risk for our country. The exact number of citizens who have joined the group is unknown, there are only estimates available. It is believed that the participation process is organized through radical groups in Turkey. It is known that people inclining towards the group are generally youngsters aged 17 to 25 and after receiving ideological training in groups, they are sent to the front.¹³⁵

Compared to the support given by Muslim groups in other countries, it is striking that the participation rate from Turkey is quite low. The same situation applies to Turks living abroad. The reason is that the religious, historical and cultural texture of this land does not allow the growth of formations like DAESH. The religious mentality inherited from the Ottoman Empire maintains its existence in the Republic era through institutions such as the Presidency of Religious Affairs, the schools of theology and imam hatip (religious) high schools as well as Religious Culture and Moral Knowledge classes. However, despite these factors, it is also observed that DAESH and similar organizations are making hard efforts to be effective in Turkey. It is clear that there is need for political measures as well as religious and cultural studies to prevent the organization from finding a base and spreading in our country.

¹³⁵ For further reading, see Selim Vatandaş, "İşid ve Türkiye'de İşid Tartışmaları", p. 13-14.

The following observation can be made after looking into the historical origins that led to the situation we face today: the military defeats, economic depression, widespread poverty, and similar reasons suffered in the Islamic world in and after the 18th century made the sense of injustice prevalent in Islamic communities. Oppressive rule, policies that prioritize the interest of a small circle over the education and prosperity of people, and many other similar reasons caused this sentiment to create bad results. It should be taken into consideration that the radicalization in the Islamic world was nurtured by this background before anything.

Another consequence of these developments was the changes that the Islamic world went through in the field of science and culture. After the 18th century, Islamic thought witnessed gradually puritanical reactions to social and political incidents and calls to revert back to the pure view of Islam. The calls to go back to the literal sense of the Qur'an and Sunnah took Islamic thought away from its traditional philosophical depth and doomed it under the call of "back to basics" to a mentality in the form of sheltering in the surface meaning of hadith and verses. The religious discourse of DAESH, which was created by the specific political conditions that emerged after 2000s in the Damascus-Iraq region, feeds on this back-to-basics, literalist-salafi approach. Therefore, everything that can be said about DAESH's religious narrative should actually start with standing to the challenge caused by this back-to-basics salafi approach. These interpretations emerged in mid-18th century but their impact became apparent only by 20th century. And they showed themselves in the said period after abandoning traditional religious approaches with a series of reforms. The Islamic approach formed instead of the conventional view suggested going back to the path of Qur'an, Sunnah, and salaf (first generations of Islam) in order to go back to the pure and real Islam. Once the traditional order was left, the Islamic thought fell apart like

a book that lost its headband. And all Muslims started to propose methods in their own way to rearrange this book. The most appealing one among them was the call to revert back to pure Islam. So much so that almost all modern interpretations of Islam were influenced in one way or another by these essentialist approaches calling back to Qur'an and Sunnah. For this reason, it is necessary for scholars of Islam to bring this call to the table, analyze it, and examine whether it is a healthy proposal. In that context, it is clear that a sound knowledge of kalam, fiqh, and sufism is necessary to establish the balance of "iman (faith) - Islam - ihsan (goodness)"¹³⁶ which constitutes Islam's main message as it was done in history. Only by doing that can we create an opportunity to get out of this intellectually (world view) poor, normatively (law, politics, ethics) insufficient, and aesthetically shallow state which we have been exposed to by the said essentialist approach.

Thanks to the aforementioned imam-hatip and theology experience, Turkey has been one of the few countries least affected by this back-to-basics Islamic approach in the world of Islam. Since Tanzimat (Ottoman reformation in 1839), Turkey aimed to establish madrasa again in school with a system founded beside the traditional madrasa education, and thus fulfill the expectations of the modern era. There have been certain ups and downs on the road without a doubt. Despite all that, this experience is what makes Turkey different and prevents Muslims born in Turkey from gravitating toward this essentialist approach inside and outside the country. The course must be kept in this way by preserving this experience and exerting efforts to create authentic and creative syntheses in the field of kalam-fiqh-sufism. Every period is responsible for creating its own approaches and practices. However, sheltering in the surface of literal senses of Qur'an and Sunnah without internalizing the outstanding aspects

¹³⁶ Muslim, "Iman", 1.

and gains of our kalam-fiqh-sufism knowledge and turning it into our intellectual capital would only make us shallow and stern. Our past Islamic experience rests on an understanding that holistically embraces the reason, wisdom, and purpose of the Qur'an and Sunnah alongside their surface meaning.

These issues we are covering clearly put forward that a deep fight with DAESH and similar groups cannot be carried out by security measures alone. Therefore, everyone has a crucial role, especially the scholars that will guide Islamic ummah, in order to develop an inclusive and embracing discourse against the dismissive and marginalizing religious narrative of DAESH.

Before anything, we need to re-examine our education order, especially our religious education and training method. When teaching religion to new generations, it is vital to tell them the reason, wisdom, and purpose in the revealing of verses. From that point, the questions of how a Muslim must behave and what should be the worldly duties and ultimate goals of a Muslim will be figured out. It must be instilled in minds that a religious life limited only to worldly gains /rule is not Muslim-like and that Islam pursues the gains of both this world and the next. After such a preparation for awareness, the techniques and methods of reading, understanding, and interpreting the hadith and verses, which were formed in 1400 years of tradition, must be brought back to life. A mindset that centralizes the main goals of religion from that framework must be employed; great care must be shown to ensure that particular verses and hadith are evaluated in unison with general principles. Islam's teachings that offer grace not only to Muslims but to all human beings, even all creatures must be brought to the forefront. It must be emphasized that views and perspectives developed within religious philosophy are not the absolute truth but an effort shown on the path of attaining the truth. Since there is no other person except for the Prophet (saw) who has the attribute

of “innocence” which means not committing sins, no Muslim’s opinion and view, regardless of their title, career, and position, can be considered to be the absolute truth. Another point to highlight is that it is not appropriate to adopt the opinions developed in history as they are and introduce them into our day. Because an opinion from history was formed depending on the time, place, atmosphere, and conditions of a specific era. Implementing opinions from history without considering today’s conditions may bring damage instead of benefit. Then, it is necessary to readdress the opinions and views developed within a specific period of history which are included in the literature of Islamic sciences and especially fiqh. And after that, they must be evaluated based on today’s conditions. For example, it should be kept in mind that concepts like dar al-harb, zimmi (non-muslim citizens of an Islamic state), and apostate reflect the conditions of their period. In that case, our entire accumulation of knowledge in fiqh should be reviewed with the same mindset. Otherwise, it will not be difficult for DAESH and similar organizations to find material from the said literature that will serve them as basis.

Another point to be considered is that families should be informed not to neglect their children with excuses like daily life and earning livelihood. Neglected children have a high risk of being exposed to distorted religious information and being allured by radical groups. Families who observe such signs in their children should take the situation seriously; if their knowledge is not sufficient, they must seek help from individuals or institutions competent in the field of religion. On this important issue, there must be an effort to raise the awareness of the whole society. On the other hand, it is an important problem that young Western converts fall into hands of salafi groups and get easily deceived by groups like DAESH. Therefore, the converts are lost on a wrong path and wasted. To make up for these drawbacks, it is

important to primarily come up with an inclusive religious narrative and present it in a suitable way.

The problem in combating with DAESH and similar groups is not the lack of religious knowledge. On the contrary, the problem is a kind of religious knowledge that is based on authentic sources but distorted with an ideological view and turned into dogma for group members. The source this and other similar groups use as a frame of reference to justify themselves is the salafi invitation and salafi faith concept. The common features of the related bodies are that they are against the Ash'arites and Maturidis, strong traditional Islamic schools formed in the 1400-year process, and they are also against sufistic inclinations in Ahl al-Sunnah style. Despite introducing themselves as Ahl al-Sunnah, they disregard its primary principle "Ahl al-Qiblah cannot be declared unbelievers" and consider members of other denominations such as Shi'a as disbelievers. In line with this mentality, they view sufism as a deviation in terms of doctrine and metaphysical thought despite not objecting to ascetic life. In that context, it should not go unnoticed that bid'ah and superstition that infiltrated into sufism serve as an excuse to defend the mindset in question.

What we have against us are dismissive groups that do not hesitate to use takfir as a means of marginalization because of their absolutist sense of truth. They do not care about form in prayers, and adopt a literalist approach focusing only on specific parts in fiqh determined by a pragmatist mentality. In the face of this alienating narrative, there is a need to develop an inclusive and embracing one. From that point of view, an understanding of religion must be put forward that embraces the entire heritage of the ummah by comprehending and improving the traditional methods of fiqh and kalam. "Even though there is one truth by Allah, every mujtahid is right." principle must be the primary starting point. The sound faith of Islam must be supported against salafi mindset which has turned into an ideology and nurtures

these movements. Imam-hatip high schools, theology schools, and the Presidency of Religious Affairs community must put in efforts to establish an awareness at this point. Moreover, the contributions of sufism culture in absorbing Islam's spiritual aspect and introducing it to masses should be taken into consideration; efforts must be exerted to keep this vein alive by clearing of bid'ah and superstition. In summary, the greatest damage inflicted by terrorist organizations seeming to be Muslim such as DAESH and others is that they have given a negative impression of Islam to the whole world. The unpleasant images and violent scenes seen on media almost every day cause the spread of Islamophobia more and more in the world. And there is a smear campaign through media claiming "Islam is a religion of violence and terror." It is for this reason that religious authorities of Muslim countries must organize effective programs in which they will altogether voice in international platforms that these groups cannot be associated with Islam, and on the contrary, Islam is a true religion of peace and grace as it is implicit in its name. They must accurately present Islam's view on "human" regardless of their religion, language, and ethnicity, and they should do it by means of contemporary tools through media such as series, films, cinema, etc. In that sense, political governments in Islamic countries must consider the needs and demands of society on religious issues which is important in preventing the manipulations of these groups in practicing Islam.

Similarly, Muslim countries should hold joint events to raise ideal youth, and help each other and show solidarity to that end. Emergency action plans must be prepared such as popularizing education programs that may serve as models, having international youth platforms carrying out more effective and frequent activities, and preparing written and visual documents in multiple languages and distributing them in all countries that will provide them with correct information and raise their awareness against terrorist organizations.

When we look at the issue in terms of our country, institutions and organizations such as Ministry of National Education (MEB), Presidency of Religious Affairs (DIB), Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT), etc. should develop emergency action plans to ensure the youth do not compliment these terrorist groups. In order to raise sufficient awareness on these issues, written and visual publications must be prepared, conferences and seminars must be held, and the youth must be informed. Especially it is important that Presidency of Religious Affairs “Youth Branch”, which operates under every mosque and Qur'an Course as in Europe, constitute and implement course programs for youth.

Presidency of Religious Affairs carries out its overseas operations solely for our Muslim citizens. From now on, new staff positions must be created and opportunities for various events must be sought to introduce the warm face of Islam against Islamophobia to people in these regions from different religions, cultures, and nationalities. The goal here should be to obviate the misperceptions in media to some extent, rather than inviting different groups to Islam. In line with this purpose, World Islamic Scholars Initiative for Peace and Common Sense must be much more active and Turkey's Religious Affairs and Theology experience in these matters must be adequately promoted.

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